News
Dispositions Other than by Published Opinions | September 8
September 7, 2021
Courts and More Vol. 1 | No. 36 | September 8, 2021
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals
Division I
Division II
119,250 – Jim C. McGough, Personal Representative of the Estate of George V. Landing, Jr., Deceased, Plaintiff, v. inVentiv Health, Inc.; inVentiv Commercial Services, LLC; Aeterna Zentaris, Inc.; Estate of Crystal Lopez, Deceased; Yokozuna, LLC; and C.J. Pint Management Company, LLC, d/b/a Arnie’s Bar, Defendants, and Estate of Crystal Lopez, Deceased, Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Sentry Insurance a Mutual Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendant, and Ace Property and Casualty Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendant/Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Tulsa County, Hon. Jefferson D. Sellers, Trial Judge. This action arises out of an automobile accident. Crystal Lopez, a Sales Representative for inVentiv Commercial Services, LLC, was driving a company vehicle when she collided with a vehicle driven by George V. Landing, Jr. Both drivers perished as a result of the accident. The present appeal concerns the motion for summary judgment filed by the Estate of Crystal Lopez. In that motion, the Estate moved the district court to declare as a matter of law that Ms. Lopez was an insured permissive driver at the time of the automobile collision, that Sentry Insurance provided liability coverage to Ms. Lopez for bodily injury and wrongful death claims arising out of the collision up to the single, per-accident policy limit of $2 million, and that Ace Property and Casualty Insurance Company provided umbrella liability coverage to Ms. Lopez with a per-occurrence limit of $25 million. Ace filed a motion for new trial challenging the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of the Estate, and the district court denied Ace’s motion. We conclude that under either Massachusetts or Oklahoma law, Ms. Lopez was using the vehicle with inVentiv’s permission at the time of the collision, and we thus conclude the district court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of the Estate of Crystal Lopez and in denying Ace’s motion for new trial. AFFIRMED. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, by BARNES, J.; WISEMAN, P.J., and BLACKWELL, J., concur. September 2, 2021
118,407 – In the Matter of the Tucker Family Trust, Dated March 27, 1998: Jon Paul Tucker and Thomas E. Tucker, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. Sharon D. Smith, Defendant/Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of Muskogee County, Hon. Norman D. Thygesen, Trial Judge. In this action on a trust, Appellants Jon Paul Tucker and Thomas E. Tucker appeal from an order in which the court denied their motion for a temporary injunction and determined that Appellee Sharon D. Smith is the Trustee and that certain trust real property transferred to her was not conveyed to her as a result of undue influence. Based on our review of the record, we conclude the trial court’s Ruling denying Appellants’ request for an injunction is not clearly against the weight of the evidence and thus is not an abuse of the court’s discretion. The trial court’s determinations that Appellee is the Trustee pursuant to an amendment to the Trust and that the conveyance of certain Trust property to her was not the result of undue influence are not clearly against the weight of the evidence; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s interlocutory order. AFFIRMED. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, by BARNES, J.; WISEMAN, P.J., concurs, and BLACKWELL, J., concurs in result. September 3, 2021
118,702 – Jeana Osborn, Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant/Appellee, vs. Debra Diane Stiger, Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff/Crossclaim Plaintiff/Appellant, and Kevin Osborn, Crossclaim Defendant/Appellee. Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County, Hon. Susan C. Stallings, Trial Judge. This action arises from the parties’ involvement in a stock purchase agreement. Following a nonjury trial, the district court’s judgment was filed in which it explained it had ordered Defendant Debra Diane Stiger, following the nonjury trial, to convert her counterclaim against Plaintiff Jeana Osborn and her crossclaim against Kevin Osborn to third-party practice. The district court stated that Ms. Stiger failed to timely file a third-party petition with summons against either Ms. Osborn or Mr. Osborn; therefore, the district court dismissed Ms. Stiger’s counterclaim and crossclaim with prejudice. However, to the extent Ms. Stiger should have filed either her crossclaim or counterclaim as claims in a third-party petition, the Osborns effectively waived such a requirement by their conduct undertaken during the three years prior to trial. Moreover, with regard to the counterclaim, the proper procedure was followed by Ms. Stiger, as the Osborns acknowledge on appeal. Consequently, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand this case to the trial court with directions to make a ruling on the evidence presented at trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. Opinion from the Court of Civil Appeals, Division II by BARNES, J.; WISEMAN, P.J., and BLACKWELL, J., concur. September 3, 2021
Division III
118,374 – Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for the Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 2005-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Safiyyah Tahir-Battles, Defendant/Appellant, and Sheldon Battles, Defendant. Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Honorable Don Andrews, Trial Judge. In this mortgage foreclosure proceeding, Defendant/Appellant, Safiyyah Tahir Battles, appeals from the trial court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiff/Appellees, Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., as Trustee for the Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust, Series 1005-NC3, Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates. Defendant executed a promissory note (Note) with New Century Mortgage Corporation in 2005 for the purchase of property in Oklahoma City. The Note was endorsed in blank from the original lender and is now in the possession of Plaintiff. Plaintiff presented evidence that the Note has been in default since September 1, 2007. The trial court denied all affirmative defenses and ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Upon review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Specifically, we hold the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by sufficient competent evidence, and that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law adequately explain the decision. AFFIRMED UNDER RULE 1.202(b) & (d). Opinion by PEMBERTON, P.J.; SWINTON, C.J., and BELL, J., concur. September 2, 2021
119,095 – In the Matter of the Estate of Lorri Gayle Tedder, Deceased, Christopher Barnes, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Ashley Myers and Courtney Vaughn, Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Lorri Gayle Tedder, Deceased, Respondents/Appellees. Appeal from the District Court of Wagoner County, Oklahoma. Honorable Dennis N. Shook, Trial Judge. In this probate proceeding, Petitioner/Appellant, Christopher Barnes, appeals from the trial court’s order appointing Respondents/Appellees, Ashley Myers and Courtney Vaughn, the decedent’s daughters, as co-personal representatives of the estate of Lorri Gayle Tedder, deceased. Appellant asserts that he and decedent entered into a common law marriage; thus, Appellant is decedent’s surviving spouse, and is entitled to serve as decedent’s administrator. The probate court determined Appellant and decedent did not establish a common law marriage. After reviewing the record, we affirm the probate court’s order appointing Appellees as co-personal representative. We also AFFIRM the court’s determination that Appellant and decedent did not mutually agree to enter into a common law marriage. Opinion by BELL, J.; SWINTON, C.J., and PEMBERTON, P.J., concur. September 2, 2021
119,176 – T.J. Chartney and Stephanie Chartney, individually and as husband and wife, T.J. Chartney and Stephanie Chartney, as natural parents and next friend of Briley Cheyenne Chartney, a minor, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. The City of Choctaw, Defendant/Appellant. Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma. Honorable Natalie Mai, Trial Judge. We review a trial court order interpreting the significance of this Court’s prior reversal and remand of the trial court’s entry of a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. In the precursor Opinion—Chartney v. City of Choctaw, 2019 OK CIV APP 26, 441 P.3d 173 (Chartney I)—the Court of Civil Appeals held that an erroneous negligence per se jury instruction resulted in the probable miscarriage of justice, warranting reversal of the entire judgment and a remand for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court determined Chartney I affected the judgment only as to the negligence claim and left intact the judgment on plaintiffs’ nuisance claim. We reverse and hold that the Court in Chartney I reversed the judgment in its entirety and remanded the matter to the trial court as if it had never been decided. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Opinion by BELL, J.; SWINTON, C.J., and GOREE (sitting by designation) J., concur. September 2, 2021
Division IV
119,627 – ESP EOC Rose Rock, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. Chaparral Energy, LLC, a/k/a Chaparral Energy, Inc., Defendant/Appellee. Appeal from an Order of the District Court of Canadian County, Hon. Jack D. McCurdy, II, Trial Judge. The plaintiff, ESP EOC Rose Rock, LLC (Rose Rock), appeals an Order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to the defendant, Chaparral Energy, LLC aka Chaparral Energy, Inc. (Chaparral). This matter involves the parties’ competing claims based upon a certain “Gothic-Chaparral Assignment.” Rose Rock claims ownership of the eleven leases in the subject Section, Township and Range outside of the existing wellbores. Chaparral claims ownership of the leases by virtue of the assignment. The parties and the trial court treated the Gothic-Chaparral Assignment as an unambiguous instrument. The trial court ruled in favor of Chaparral and granted summary judgment. After review, this Court finds that the Gothic-Chaparral Assignment conveyed the subject oil and gas leases and is not ambiguous. The trial court correctly interpreted the Gothic-Chaparral Assignment. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Chaparral and denying summary judgment to Rose Rock. The summary judgment in favor of Chaparral Energy, LLC, a/k/a Chaparral Energy, Inc. is affirmed. AFFIRMED. Opinion from Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, by RAPP, J.; FISCHER, V.C.J., and WISEMAN, J. (sitting by designation), concur. September 3, 2021
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