In April 2025, two Oklahoma court cases quietly clarified the legal landscape to potentially better protect businesses and corporations from tort liability when the damages in a dispute are strictly economic in nature and arise from a contractual relationship. This article explores the implications of the economic loss doctrine, as discussed in the Oklahoma Supreme Court case Mills v. J-M Mfg. Co.[1] and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals case Proe v. Diamond Homes,[2] and whether those cases set the stage for broader application of the doctrine, which, in Oklahoma, has traditionally been limited to manufacturer’s products liability cases.

To the extent the economic loss doctrine is ripe for expansion, this article examines how that might impact Oklahoma businesses, contractual risk allocation and the scope and application of the doctrine. A historical review of the doctrine is significant to highlight the principles underpinning the doctrine and the rationale for its potential expansion in Oklahoma.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN OKLAHOMA

The economic loss doctrine “is a court-created doctrine that bars recovery under manufacturer’s product liability for purely economic injury to the product itself.”[3] In Oklahoma, the doctrine traces its roots to Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc.[4] There, the plaintiffs (consumers) sued a mobile home manufacturer under theories of products liability after their mobile home experienced excessive condensation buildup.[5] The plaintiffs asserted claims of design defect and breach of warranties. The plaintiffs’ damages were the mobile home’s deterioration from the excessive condensation, which was essentially the cost of the mobile home. The plaintiffs did not assert a claim for personal injury or other property damage; their damages were strictly economic in nature. As an issue of first impression, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the question of “whether manufacturers’ products liability applies to purely economic damages.”[6] The issue boiled down to an analysis of the relationship between products liability (tort, in nature) and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (contract, in nature). The Waggoner court noted that liability under a products liability theory is primarily tortious in nature, “independent of UCC warranty provisions because recovery under manufacturers’ products liability arises from a duty to the public rather than from a contractual relationship.”[7] In contrast, the court stated that recovery under the UCC arises out of the contractual relationship between a buyer and a seller of goods, including recovery of a buyer’s economic losses (in Waggoner, like other commercial disputes, the contract established the basis for the application of the UCC and recovery of economic losses).[8]

The Waggoner court explained that tort law, as compared to the UCC and contract law, has not traditionally protected the economic expectations of parties.[9] This gave reason for the court to conclude that “economic damages are more logically related to the UCC than to manufacturer’s products liability.”[10] This observation that the UCC and, by extension, contract law provided a sufficient avenue for recovery of economic losses positioned the Waggoner court to find “no need to extend manufacturers’ liability into an area already occupied by the UCC.”[11] The Waggoner court proclaimed, “To extend manufacturers’ products liability to include purely economic losses would undermine the UCC’s comprehensive and finely tuned statutory mechanism for dealing with the rights of parties to a sales transaction with respect to economic losses.”[12] Ultimately, the Waggoner court held, “In Oklahoma no action lies in manufacturers’ products liability for injury only to the product itself resulting in purely economic loss.”[13]

The holding in Waggoner followed the rationale used by the United States Supreme Court four years earlier in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delava Inc.[14] In an opinion delivered by Justice Blackmun, East River is widely credited as the first U.S. Supreme Court decision to adopt and apply the economic loss doctrine. In adopting the position that purely economic losses are not recoverable in products liability, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that “protection of the buyers’ expectations as to product value ‘is precisely the purpose of express and implied warranties.’”[15]

Only two years after Waggoner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court revisited the application of the economic loss doctrine in Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. McGraw-Edison Co.[16] Significantly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court more clearly characterized manufacturers’ products liability cases, absent personal injury or property damage, as actions sounding in contract rather than tort. The court held that a plaintiff in a manufacturer’s products liability action cannot recover damages for injury to the allegedly defective product itself and consequential economic harm flowing from that injury.[17] This rationale was then reaffirmed in Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.,[18] when the Oklahoma Supreme Court had the chance to recognize one of the exceptions to the economic loss doctrine – where personal injury is involved in the products defect claim.

The holdings and rationale of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in these cases draw upon one of the bedrock principles underlying the doctrine: maintaining a clear distinction between tort and contract law when a contract remedy suffices and there has been no personal injury or damage to property.[19]

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN OKLAHOMA AND ITS POTENTIAL EXPANSION

Recent Oklahoma case law more clearly defined the boundary between tort and contract and, in doing so, arguably opened the door for further application of the economic loss doctrine. First, in Mills v. J-M Mfg. Co.,[20] the Oklahoma Supreme Court undoubtedly recognized the second exception to the economic loss doctrine – where there is damage to property other than the product itself.[21] This exception is often referred to as the “other property” exception.

After recognizing this exception to the doctrine, the Mills court took a step further, analyzing whether the doctrine barred an indemnity claim brought by a third party that owned the “other property” that was damaged.[22] Mills involved a products defect claim brought by property owners whose property was damaged after a saltwater pipe sold by Rainmaker, manufactured by JM Eagle and installed by Charter Oak failed under pressure.[23] After Charter Oak settled with the property owners, Charter Oak sought indemnity from Rainmaker and JM Eagle.[24] Importantly, the indemnity claim was based on the legal relationship of the parties, not a contractual indemnity relationship.[25] While reaffirming that the doctrine “bars recovery under manufacturer’s products liability for purely economic injury to the product itself,” the Mills court held that the doctrine did not bar the indemnity claim.[26] Specifically, the Mills court held, “The economic loss rule does not bar a claim for indemnity where a party satisfies a legal obligation to compensate for damage to third-party property caused by a defective product.”[27] In rendering its decision, the Mills court highlighted the primary purpose of the doctrine: “to preserve the boundary between tort and contract by precluding recovery for purely economic losses where contract remedies exist.”[28] Additionally, the Mills court reasoned that applying the doctrine to bar the indemnity claim would have been inequitable by punishing Charter Oak for fulfilling its nondelegable duty to the property owners despite having no connection to the cause of the product’s failure.[29]

In a footnote, the Mills court noted that other jurisdictions had extended the economic loss doctrine beyond products liability. The court declined to extend the doctrine at this time but potentially left open the door by stating that the court has not “adopted such an expansive approach, and the facts of this case do not warrant doing so.”[30] By declining to expand the doctrine based on the specific facts presented in Mills, the Oklahoma Supreme Court may be receptive to further development of the economic loss doctrine if the facts warrant such consideration.

Perhaps providing an additional steppingstone for further application of the economic loss doctrine, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals published its opinion in Proe v. Diamond Homes[31] only three weeks after Mills. Proe involved a residential construction dispute between the homeowners, the builder and a contract employee of the builder.[32] The homeowners sued the builder and a contract employee for breach of contract and negligence in the construction of their home, alleging that the defendants failed to construct their home in a workmanlike manner free from defects and were responsible for the design and preparation of the concrete slab at issue in the case.[33] In affirming the district court’s decision barring the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, the Proe court relied on the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s reasoning in Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank,[34] a case far from the products liability realm.

Rodgers involved a dispute between a bank and borrowers on a loan to purchase real estate.[35] The question presented was whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court should “extend the implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing, [...] imposed upon contracts of insurance, to contracts for commercial loans in order to support a cause of action for tortious breach of contract.”[36] In declining to do so, the Rodgers court emphasized that the borrower’s tort claim arose solely from contract, and, as such, without some independent basis to support their tort claim, it was simply one sounding in contract.[37] While not expressly stating it, the decision in Rodgers reaffirmed the same bedrock principle underlying the economic loss doctrine, which is that tort and contract doctrines, including the liability flowing therefrom, should remain separate. The court in Rodgers reaffirmed the principle that if a contract remedy will suffice, then a tort claim is simply proof of the breach of contract, and the separate tort claim should be barred, absent some independent basis for the tort claim.

The Proe court followed the Rodgers rationale in finding that the negligence claim against the contract employee failed because the contract employee’s status as an agent protected him from tort liability.[38] The employee had a contractual relationship with the homebuilder, not the homeowners. Under those circumstances, Oklahoma law provides that an “agent’s breach of duty owed to the principal is not an independent basis for the agent’s tort liability to a third party.”[39] Rather, the duty owed is grounded in the contractual relationship between the parties. At first blush (and ultimately), the well-established privity of contract requirement appeared to bar the negligence claim between the homeowners and the contract employee. Judge Barnes wrote a concurrence that affirmed dismissal based on lack of privity. The majority, however, affirmed for a separate reason. The majority explained that to avoid the privity requirement, the homeowners’ tort claim against the contract employee would have to be based on conduct independent of that covered by the employee’s contractual duty.[40] The majority emphasized that Oklahoma law recognizes the difference between a contractual duty and a tort duty, and when the duty alleged to have been breached arises solely from contract, then the alleged negligent conduct is nothing more than proof of the breach of contract.[41]

Applying this same rationale, the majority held that the homeowners’ tort claim was barred against the homebuilder by the principles supporting the economic loss doctrine. In analyzing the interplay between the negligence claim and contract claim against the homebuilder, the majority elaborated on the reasoning underlying the basis for separating tort and contract doctrines and liability. The majority noted that prior Oklahoma Supreme Court cases authorizing simultaneous tort and contract claims involved injuries beyond the particular matter of contract.[42] The majority, accordingly, articulated the clarifying statement that “if there is no damage to person or property ... beyond the particular matter of the contract, there is no tort.”[43] The tort claim against the contract employee failed because there was no damage to person or property.

Perhaps seeing the opening provided by Mills, the majority in Proe observed, “Courts applying the economic loss rule outside the products liability context have found its products liability origin equally sound in breach of contract cases.”[44] The majority noted that, at its core, the economic loss doctrine “serves to maintain a distinction between contract and tort law.”[45] By adopting and applying the doctrine in Proe, the majority connected the dots: “Oklahoma has not adopted the economic loss rule, by name, outside the manufacturer’s products liability context ... . Nonetheless, that legal principle is consistent with Oklahoma law on the damages available for breach of contract in the absence of personal injury or damage to other property.”[46] Even Judge Barnes’ concurring opinion that affirmed based on privity principles recognized the doctrine for what it could be, pronouncing the economic loss doctrine to be “a legal doctrine that bars recovery in tort actions where a contractual relationship between the parties exist and the losses claimed are purely economic losses.”[47]

Proe should not be viewed as an outlier decision as it is consistent with Mills and prior precedent. The majority’s opinion in Proe clarified the boundary between contract and tort law – when a contractual relationship governs a dispute in which there is not personal injury or damage to other property, a party cannot simply assert an alternative negligence claim as an end-around for the longstanding privity of contract requirement. The holding does not appear to extend the meaning of the economic loss doctrine under Oklahoma law but rather recognizes that it may be a tool or basis to reaffirm these longstanding bedrock principles of contract and tort law.

While neither Mills nor Proe expanded the economic loss doctrine, they may have opened the door for applying the doctrine beyond the manufacturers’ products liability context in the future. Mills began by examining an exception to the doctrine in the construction defects context, noting other jurisdictions that have extended the doctrine, but explaining that the case-specific facts did not warrant expansion. Proe recognized that the economic loss doctrine could be applicable in certain circumstances to reaffirm longstanding principles separating contract and tort law, such as privity of contract. Furthermore, Proe analyzed the doctrine’s underlying rationale in the construction context and tied that reasoning to Oklahoma Supreme Court precedent outside of the manufacturer’s products liability realm. Is this equation sufficient to result in further application of the doctrine? Often, when courts develop judicial doctrines, they look to other jurisdictions for guidance.

LESSONS FROM THE APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

The majority of courts in other jurisdictions have already taken the next step in applying the economic loss doctrine to cases outside of the manufacturers’ products liability context. In its broadest sense, the doctrine could be asserted in any dispute that is governed by a contract. For instance, courts have widely extended the doctrine to cases involving construction defects and professional services.

At least 10 other jurisdictions have held that the doctrine bars tort claims involving design professionals and engineers, absent personal injury or damage to property.[48]

Two cases – Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc. v. Rummel Klepper & Kahl, LLP[49] and Terracon Consultants W., Inc. v. Mandalay Resort Grp.[50] – among others, serve as anchoring guides in applying the economic loss doctrine to negligence claims levied against design professionals and engineers, typically in a construction defect setting. Both cases also present additional legal rationales worth considering when one is involved in a dispute wherein the economic loss doctrine could apply.

Terracon Consultants W., Inc. v. Mandalay Resort Grp. serves as a modern example of a state supreme court extending the economic loss doctrine logic beyond product manufacturers and into construction/professional services. Furthermore, by refusing to permit negligence claims against design professionals in commercial projects, Terracon emphasized protecting parties’ bargain-based risk allocation via contract and limited unforeseeable tort exposure for businesses, which fosters economic predictability.

Balfour addressed the applicability of the economic loss doctrine to claims of negligent misrepresentation brought by a contractor against a design engineering firm that produced construction design plans for the city of Baltimore. At the outset, Balfour explained that there is typically tension between a contractor and an engineer in the design-bid-build model.[51] Generally, the contractor and engineer each have separate contracts with the owner but no contractual relationship with each other.[52] When delays in the construction project occur, the contractor may blame the engineer for a flawed design (for example, claiming negligent misrepresentation based on faulty information in the design documents) despite the lack of a contractual relationship with the engineer. On the other hand, the engineer has an interest in defending their design and denying any change order or request for modified plans submitted by the contractor. Because of the lack of a contractual relationship, the contractor may be inclined to assert tort claims against the engineer. However, permitting tort liability against a design professional in the absence of a contractual relationship, personal injury or property damage may cause the design professional’s typically neutral position to shift to a position in which it considers tort liability in executing its design plans.[53] This is similar to the idea of a doctor practicing defensive medicine. Further, exposing the engineer to tort liability for purely economic damages would prevent parties from negotiating and defining their economic risks via contract. Consequently, applying the doctrine could protect the design engineer’s neutrality and prevent a chilling effect that could occur if tort liability extended to the design engineer.[54]

On appeal, the Balfour court examined whether to extend a duty in tort to persons not in privity for the recovery of purely economic losses. There, the court held, “The economic loss doctrine represents a judicial refusal to extend tort liability to negligence that causes purely economic harm in the absence of privity, physical injury, or risk of physical injury.”[55] This holding aligns with Oklahoma’s recognition and requirement of privity of contract to bring a cognizable claim in the construction defect context.[56]

While the economic loss doctrine has been applied in other jurisdictions to construction defect and design professional cases, other jurisdictions have imposed limits and exceptions to the doctrine. For example, in 2023, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the doctrine applies only in products liability cases and does not extend to service contracts.[57] This is all to say that despite the simplicity of the underlying principles, historical precedence and expansion in other districts, we do not yet know whether the doctrine will be extended beyond manufacturers’ products liability by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. In the meantime, it is imperative for practitioners and businesses to pay attention to the evolving case law and prepare accordingly.

TURN YOUR ECONOMIC LOSS INTO ECONOMIC GAIN AND AVOID LITIGATION HEADACHES

With the stage set by Mills and Proe, businesses and corporations should arm themselves with the doctrine any time a contract dispute arises with purely economic damages at issue. This is particularly important in disputes involving commercial transactions, especially when statutory provisions, like those found in the UCC, may apply. As it currently stands, Oklahoma district courts are being presented with, examining and adjudicating arguments involving the economic loss doctrine in construction defect cases. In practice, contract language and terms, along with warranty disclaimers and limitations of liability clauses, should receive close attention in drafting and particularly when litigation is initiated. Indeed, Oklahoma law provides that contracts may exclude claims for “indirect or consequential damages” and may limit tort liability as long as the contract language is clear and unambiguous as to the parties’ intent to restrict tort liability.[58] Businesses and their lawyers should work to allocate their risks to explicit contractual terms – including “no tort liability” clauses.

On the other hand, those seeking claims that can be tied to a contract should anticipate the economic loss doctrine being raised as a defense. It appears that Oklahoma courts, through Mills and Proe, have brought to focus that which may have been blurry by recognizing that the doctrine can serve as a basis to reaffirm the principle that it is improper to bring a negligence claim plea as an alternative to a breach of contract claim as an end-around in a dispute where contract terms govern and privity applies. Additionally, anticipating further application of the doctrine may serve as a point of future litigation efficiency. Being aware that the doctrine could apply in certain circumstances should cause parties to change their behavior. Understanding the boundary for viable claims could save litigants both time and expense. Addressing these issues early, when parties are negotiating and drafting contractual terms, could avoid costly litigation.

Ultimately, Oklahoma courts have provided a sound and principled basis for the expansion of the doctrine into construction matters and commercial transactions, as well as other areas. In-house counsel and legal practitioners alike should closely monitor the evolution and application of the doctrine, while businesses and corporations should, likewise, prepare for a potential expansion of the economic loss doctrine and how they might protect themselves with it.

---

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Wilson D. McGarry is a director at Crowe Dunlevy, representing clients in high-stakes civil and white-collar criminal matters, including complex commercial litigation and internal investigations. Prior to joining the firm, Mr. McGarry served as an assistant United States attorney for over a decade in the Western District of Oklahoma. He earned his J.D. from the OU College of Law.

 

 

 

 

Evan G. Vincent is a shareholder and trial attorney at Crowe Dunlevy with significant litigation experience serving as lead counsel for a variety of complex and high-stakes civil disputes. He was inducted as a member of the American Board of Trial Advocates in 2023 and has achieved the advocate designation from the National Institute for Trial Advocacy. Mr. Vincent is a graduate of the OU College of Law and earned an LL.M. in trial advocacy from the Temple University Beasley School of Law.

 

 

 

---

ENDNOTES

[1] 2025 OK 23, 567 P.3d 385.

[2] 2025 OK CIV APP 18, 574 P.3d 1.

[3] Mills v. J-M Mfg. Co., 2025 OK 23, ¶15, 567 P.3d 385, 389.

[4] Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 1990 OK 139, 808 P.2d 649.

[5] Id. at ¶¶3-12.

[6] Id. at ¶14.

[7] Id. at ¶15.

[8] Id. at ¶19.

[9] Id. at ¶20.

[10] Id.

[11] Id. at ¶21.

[12] Id. at ¶21 (internal quotations omitted).

[13] Id. at ¶22.

[14] East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delava, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).

[15] Waggoner, 1990 OK 139, ¶22 (citing East River, 476 U.S. at 872).

[16] Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 1992 OK 108, 834 P.2d 980.

[17] Id. at ¶¶1-6 (emphasis added).

[18] 1992 OK 155, 845 P.2d 187.

[19] Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 1992 OK 155, 845 P.2d 187.

[20] 2025 OK 23, 567 P.3d 385.

[21] Mills v. J-M Mfg. Co., 2025 OK 23, ¶18, 567 P.3d 385.

[22] Id. at ¶19.

[23] Id. at ¶¶2-3.

[24] Id.

[25] Id. at ¶¶8-13.

[26] Id. at ¶¶15 and 21.

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at ¶20.

[29] Id.

[30] Id. at fn. 5. In declining to extend the economic loss doctrine, it should not be overlooked that the Mills court cited other jurisdictions that have extended the doctrine beyond the context of products liability, yet the court explained that it had not adopted “such an expansive approach.”

[31] 2025 OK CIV APP 18, 574 P.3d 1.

[32] Proe v. Diamond Homes, 2025 OK CIV APP 18, ¶¶1-2, 574 P.3d 1.

[33] Id. at ¶¶4-5.

[34] 1988 OK 36, ¶18, 756 P.2d 1223.

[35] Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 1988 OK 36, ¶18, 756 P.2d 1223.

[36] Id. at ¶1.

[37] Id. at ¶18 (“The duty alleged in the borrowers’ alternative theory of recovery for tortious breach arises solely from contract. Without independent basis to support a tortious wrongdoing, there is nothing more than an alleged breach of that contract.”).

[38] Proe, 574 P.3d 1 at ¶20.

[39] Id.

[40] Id. at ¶24.

[41] Id. at ¶25.

[42] Proe, at ¶37.

[43] Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[44] Id. at ¶38.

[45] Id. (citing Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000)).

[46] Proe, 574 P.3d 1 at ¶42.

[47] Proe, 574 P.3d 1 at ¶3 (Barnes, C.J., concurring opinion).

[48] See e.g., Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc. v. Rummel Klepper & Kahl, LLP, 451 Md. 600, 630, 155 A.3d 445, 462-63 (2017) (“We apply the economic loss doctrine and decline to impose tort liability on Engineer for purely economic injuries alleged by Contractor that was neither in privity nor suffered physical injury or risk of physical injury.”); Berschauer/Phillips Const. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 124 Wash. 2d 816, 881 P.2d 986, 990 (1994) (“[T]he economic loss rule does not allow a general contractor to recover purely economic damages in tort from a design professional.”); Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Sheridan Area Water Supply Joint Powers Bd., 929 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Wyo. 1996) (economic loss doctrine barred Restatement (Second) of Torts §552 claim by contractor against engineer); LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., 435 S.W.3d 234, 249-50 (Tex. 2014) (economic loss doctrine bars negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims by general contractors against architects for delay damages); BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 74, 75 (Colo. 2004) (economic loss doctrine barred subcontractor’s negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims against engineering firm and inspector); Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Pub. Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722, 740 (Ind. 2010) (economic loss doctrine precluded negligence claims by an owner against parties connected to it through “a network or chain of contracts”); Terracon Consultants W., Inc. v. Mandalay Resort Grp., 125 Nev. 66, 206 P.3d 81, 89 (2009) (“In the context of engineers and architects, the bar created by the economic loss doctrine applies to commercial activity for which contract law is better suited to resolve professional negligence claims.”); Fleischer v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“[A]n architect owes no tort duty of care and is not liable to a general contractor or construction manager for damages for economic losses arising as a result of the architect's negligent performance of its contract with the owner.”); Kalahari Development, LLC v. Iconica, Inc., 811 N.W.2d 825, 832-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012); Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P’ship v. Design All., Inc., 223 Ariz. 320, 329, 223 P.3d 664, 673 (2010) (“the policy concerns that justify applying the [economic loss] doctrine to construction defect cases do not justify distinguishing between contractors on the one hand and design professionals, including architects, on the other.”); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 248 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating, “Contract law is better suited to resolve disputes between parties where a plaintiff alleges direct and consequential losses that were within the contemplation of sophisticated business entities with equal bargaining power and that could have been the subject of their negotiations”); SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 683-684 (Utah 2001).

[49] 226 Md. App. 420, 130 A.3d 1024 (2016), aff’d, 451 Md. 600, 155 A.3d 445 (2017).

[50] 125 Nev. 66, 206 P.3d 81, 89 (2009).

[51] Balfour, 226 Md. App. at 429 (“Some contractors believe they can increase profits through change orders that are based on ambiguities, errors, or omissions in the [engineer]’s design. [Engineers] have an interest in protecting their designs, and frequently serve as the owner’s representative during construction.”).

[52] Id.

[53] Id. at 453.

[54] See Balfour, 226 Md. App. at 452 (discussing the potential chilling effect caused by permitting the extension of tort liability to the design engineer).

[55] Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc. v. Rummel Klepper & Kahl, LLP, 451 Md. 600, 611, 155 A.3d 445, 451 (2017).

[56] See Proe v. Homes, --- P.3d ----, ¶26, 2025 OK CIV APP 18.

[57] Com. Painting Co. Inc. v. Weitz Co. LLC, 676 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2023).

[58] Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Penn Square Mall Ltd. P’ship, 2018 OK CIV APP 56, §13, 425 P.3d 757.