Reservation Realities: Oklahoma Taxation of Tribal Members Post-McGirt Under Stroble and New Challenges to Tribal Sovereignty Including Hunting and Fishing Regulation

By Jeff D. Trevillion Jr. and Mike McBride III

The 2025 case of Stroble v. Oklahoma Tax Commission[i] presents a textbook example of what happens when state tax authority collides with federal Indian law. The legal stakes here are high, and the boundaries are contested when the state makes challenges to federal Indian law.

In Stroble, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided that Oklahoma may tax the income of Alicia Stroble, an enrolled citizen of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation who both lives and works for her tribe within the boundaries of the Creek Reservation. With McGirt v. Oklahoma[ii] reaffirming the reservation’s existence and boundaries, Ms. Stroble contended that taxing her income violated long-standing and controlling federal precedents. This article explains the facts, legal arguments, and broader implications of the Stroble case, positioning it within the shifting terrain of tribal sovereignty and state power post-McGirt.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Stroble, the taxpayer at the center of the tax controversy, is a Muscogee (Creek) Nation citizen. She works for the nation on trust land and earns her income entirely within “Indian country.” Ms. Stroble lives on land in Okmulgee County situated well within the boundaries of the Creek Reservation recognized in McGirt, thus she claimed her income should remain outside the state’s reach.[iii] Whether McGirt applies to civil and regulatory matters and not just criminal matters was the issue in dispute.

The Oklahoma Administrative Code provides for a tribal income tax exemption for an enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe when the member is 1) “living within ‘Indian Country’ under the jurisdiction of the tribe to which the member belongs,” and 2) “the income is earned from sources within ‘Indian Country’ under the jurisdiction of the tribe to which the member belongs.”[iv] After Ms. Stroble claimed the tribal income exemption on her 2017–19 tax returns, the Oklahoma Tax Commission (OTC) denied the exemption. Both sides stipulated that Ms. Stroble is a tribal citizen and that she earned all of her income from sources within Indian country. The OTC, however, claimed Ms. Stroble did not satisfy the requirement of living on “Indian land.” Ms. Stroble filed a tax protest challenging the OTC’s denial of her claimed exemption.

An OTC administrative law judge (ALJ) initially ruled in Ms. Stroble’s favor,[v] but the commissioners reversed the ALJ’s findings, conclusions and recommendations.[vi] On July 1, 2025, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the commission’s decision, prompting Ms. Stroble to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari review.[vii] On April 6, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Ms. Stroble’s petition for certiorari without comment.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Federal Indian law has long enforced a “neutral zone” between state and tribal authority, particularly when it comes to taxation. The seminal case, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,[viii] established the categorical rule that states cannot tax the income of tribal citizens who live and work in Indian country unless Congress clearly authorizes it. And in 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court adhered to this “per se” tax rule, sanctioning the OTC in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation.[ix]

In McGirt the U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation was never disestablished. This was a win for tribal sovereignty, when the U.S. Supreme Court clearly reaffirmed the reservation’s boundaries: the entire Creek Reservation is “Indian country” under federal law. And after McGirt, under the established law of McClanahan, one would have thought that the state clearly could not tax the income of tribal citizens like Ms. Stroble, who live and work in the Creek Reservation. But the OTC responded that McGirt only applied to criminal law.

The Oklahoma Administrative Code requires tribal members to both live and work in “Indian country” to qualify for the tax exemption.[x] Here, the OTC asserted Ms. Stroble’s residence was inside the reservation for criminal law purposes, but on private fee land, and thus not in “Indian country” for purposes of the tribal income tax exemption. Ms. Stroble maintained that interpretation misreads the rules. Federal law, particularly 18 U.S.C. §1151(a), defines “Indian country” to include all land within “reservation” boundaries, regardless of ownership type.

ARGUMENTS AND REASONING

Ms. Stroble’s argument was straightforward: she lives and works within the reservation. She relied on McGirt and federal tax immunity precedent to argue the OTC’s residency requirement is too narrow and conflicts with controlling federal law.

The OTC insisted that the relevant information for state income tax exemption purposes is the title ownership status of her residence: Whether her residence is in a tribal land trust or in private fee ownership determines if it is “Indian country.” Ms. Stroble contended that OTC interpretation was a misapplication of both federal precedent and 18 U.S.C. §1151, the federal criminal statute the OTC relied on when it promulgated its definition of “Indian country.”[xi] In her view, nothing in the exemption was reliant on the type of land ownership.

The ALJ agreed with Ms. Stroble. He found that Ms. Stroble earned her income entirely in Indian country, and that her residence, though on fee land, was within the reservation. The OTC, however, disagreed. Ms. Stroble appealed in 2022.

After deliberating for nearly three years, the Oklahoma Supreme Court effectively limited the scope of McGirt, ruling that its holding did not extend to civil matters like taxation.[xii] The court, in a short 6-3 per curiam ruling, affirmed the OTC order denying Ms. Stroble’s exemption. The deeply divided justices also issued five separately written concurring opinions and one dissenting opinion. The slip opinions together ran 120 pages.

The per curium order effectively sent the ball to the U.S. Supreme Court as the Oklahoma Supreme Court majority was not ready to make a sweeping civil decision:

The United States Supreme Court's declaration – 113 years after statehood – that nearly half of Oklahoma is a reservation is unprecedented. To date, the United States Supreme Court has not extended its ruling in McGirt beyond the Major Crimes Act. To date, the United States Supreme Court has not extended its ruling in McGirt to the State's civil or taxing jurisdiction. And it is not this Court's place to do so.[xiii]

Chief Justice Rowe concurred with the majority, stating that the court should not expand McGirt's holding to civil regulatory law, including taxation. He acknowledged that the OTC had incorporated the Major Crimes Act’s definition of “Indian country” into its regulation and emphasized that the OTC has the authority to promulgate rules that have the force of law unless amended or revised. But he suggested that Ms. Stroble’s appeal sought to apply McGirt retroactively, to tax returns from 2017-2019, which he said could not be done.[xiv]

Vice-Chief Justice Kuehn concurred specially, acknowledging the McGirt ruling regarding reservation status but stating that it does not resolve the issue of whether the state can impose income taxes on a tribal citizen living and working on the tribe's reservation. She also suggested that the court should not apply McGirt to civil tax issues, as federal Indian law regarding civil taxation is less clear-cut than criminal jurisdiction.[xv]

Justice Winchester concurred, discussing the practical implications of extending McGirt to civil matters, including the potential impact on state taxation and governance. Additionally, he highlighted the potential economic consequences of divesting the state of its taxing authority over fee land, which he said could undermine the state economy and its ability to fund essential services.[xvi]

Justice Darby concurred specially, arguing that the remaining Creek Reservation is not "Indian country" for tax purposes because it is not set aside for use by Native Americans under federal superintendence.[xvii]

Justice Kane, joined by Justice Jett, concurred specially, asserting that federal law does not preempt Oklahoma's authority to tax Ms. Stroble's income and that no Oklahoma statute or regulation exempts her from paying income tax.[xviii] This concurrence also declares O.A.C. §710:50-15-2(b) void.[xix] He further argued that the OTC did not adopt the Major Crimes Act's definition of "Indian country" in its regulation and that the commission's definition does not include private fee land.[xx]

Justice Combs, joined by Justices Edmondson and Gurich, dissented, arguing that long-standing U.S. Supreme Court precedents defining "Indian country" for purposes of state taxation require victory for Ms. Stroble in her income tax protest. The dissent contended that the OTC’s rule adopted the Major Crimes Act's definition of "Indian country," and that McGirt's recognition of the Creek Reservation should apply to civil tax matters.[xxi]

THE PATH TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

The Oklahoma Supreme Court opinion appeared to contravene a long line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the Major Crimes Act’s definition of “Indian country” and its applicability to civil jurisdiction, in addition to the U.S. Supreme court cases limiting the power of states to tax tribes and their citizens. Thus, Ms. Stroble filed a petition for a Writ of Certiorari, citing the following reasons for granting the petition: 1) the Oklahoma Supreme Court “Flouts This [U.S. Supreme Court] Court’s Precedents;” 2) the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision “Creates a Conflict of Authority;” (3) the question presented (“Whether Oklahoma may tax the income of a Muscogee (Creek) Nation citizen who lives and works within the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation that McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894 (2020), held remains Indian country.”); and 4) the Stroble case is an “Ideal Vehicle” to resolve the question presented.[xxii]

Many tribal governments, as well as the National Congress of American Indians, United South and Eastern Tribes Sovereignty Protection Fund, Native American Finance Officers Association, and the National Intertribal Tax Alliance, filed amici curiae briefs supporting Ms. Stroble, with arguments ranging from “Tribal nations are sovereign governments responsible for building thriving economies and communities”[xxiii] to the Oklahoma decision “Flouts This Court’s Categorical Tax-Preemption Rule.”[xxiv]

The U.S. Supreme Court relisted her case for conference review nine times, but on April 6, 2026, it ultimately denied certiorari without comment.

BROADER LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The Stroble case was a blockbuster moment for federal Indian tax and civil regulatory law, positioned for the national stage. By narrowing McGirt’s scope to criminal law only, Oklahoma ultimately sought to move the goalpost again on tribal sovereignty. Stroble contended it was a move that risked undermining decades of per se tax law precedent.

This case not only highlighted the conflict between state-level administrative rules and federal Indian law, but it also raised fundamental questions about how state sovereignty can or cannot operate within the boundaries of Indian reservations affirmed by federal courts. When state agencies disregard federal precedent, it sets up a jurisdictional tug-of-war that places individual tribal citizens like Ms. Stroble in an unstable legal limbo and threatens larger tribal sovereignty interests.

The U.S. Supreme Court, the 10th Circuit and several other circuits interpret 18 U.S.C. §1151 as defining Indian country for both criminal and civil purposes.[xxv] The Oklahoma Supreme Court, declining to follow this approach, created jurisdictional concerns and signaled the need for federal review. The rule of law requires consistency across jurisdictions, and a failure to resolve the jurisdictional split allows similar cases to proliferate, undermining both tribal sovereignty and uniform application of federal law.

Finally, the practical implications are significant. If states like Oklahoma can tax tribal citizens in Indian country, it erodes tribal governments’ ability to raise revenue and fund services. Conversely, existing state income tax revenue would certainly diminish if the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled otherwise.

Tribal and state interests closely watched and highly anticipated this ruling. Collectively, those interests were huge: If McGirt extended to all of the “Five Tribes” reservations in eastern Oklahoma, the OTC estimated that the state’s loss in income tax revenue would exceed $72 million per year and that potential individual taxpayer refund claims for the disputed three tax years could total $218 million. But the issue of tribal sovereignty jurisdiction, including whether and to what extent tribes have civil regulatory and tax powers over fee lands within their reservations, was arguably even larger.

Ultimately, the Oklahoma justices found very little common ground to agree upon. The U.S. Supreme Court had a chance to resolve the issue once and for all. After over three months of internal conference debate, however, it ultimately denied certiorari review of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Stroble without comment, apparently not wanting to utilize Stroble as a vehicle to resolve these lingering civil jurisdiction disputes.

MCGIRT AND ITS CONTINUING IMPLICATIONS

While McGirt arose in the criminal context, its affirmation of the continued existence of reservations has triggered significant questions about civil and regulatory jurisdiction, including taxation and also hunting and fishing enforcement. In McGirt, the U.S. Supreme Court largely set aside considerations such as practical governance concerns, funding challenges, or administrative inconvenience, focusing instead on the plain treaty and statutory text recognizing reservation boundaries. Only Congress can extinguish or disestablish reservations.

However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Stroble illustrates that, in the civil, tax and regulatory contexts, these practical and equitable considerations remain very much in play. As courts grapple with the post-McGirt legal landscape, state and tribal governments can expect continued litigation over:

• State Taxation Authority in Indian Country. Tribes may assert that certain state taxes are preempted by federal law or unlawfully infringe on tribal self-government. State and local governments will likely maintain that only incidence of taxation on trust or allotments lands will qualify for state tax exemptions –commerce occurring on, or income earned on, fee lands within Indian reservations would be subject to state tax.
• Jurisdictional Uncertainty and Economic Impacts. Businesses, including tribally owned enterprises, face uncertainty about tax obligations and potential liabilities. Local governments and tribes will have to work through allocating resources to pay for, provide and administer traditional municipal services such as police, fire, sewer, water, sanitation, animal control, code and building inspections and the like.[xxvi]
• Retroactive Claims and Refunds. The state may confront claims for significant tax refunds for transactions previously taxed in areas now confirmed as Indian country under McGirt. But with the denial of certiorari review, tax refunds will be limited geographically to tribal citizens that live on trust or allotted lands, not fee lands within a reservation.

Recent developments: Hunting and Fishing Regulation

While Stroble certiorari briefing before the U.S. Supreme Court was in progress during the fall of 2025, Gov. Stitt sought to enforce hunting regulations on Native American citizens within Choctaw reservation lands in eastern Oklahoma. Gov. Stitt relied upon the Stroble and City of Tulsa v. O’Brien rulings to exercise state civil-regulatory hunting and fishing enforcement against Native Americans.[xxvii] This triggered litigation between Gov. Stitt and several large tribes, including the Choctaw, Cherokee and Chickasaw Nations, supported by Attorney General Gentner Drummond. In November 2025, the large tribes filed a federal lawsuit against Governor Stitt, his special prosecutor and the Oklahoma Department of Wildlife to stop them from enforcing the regulations, which they claimed violated their sovereign treaty rights.[xxviii] Meanwhile, Attorney General Drummond subsequently issued Attorney General Opinion 2025-19, which declared Gov. Stitt’s hunting enforcement to be unlawful.[xxix] He declared that federal law preempts and thus prohibits Oklahoma from prosecuting tribal citizens for exercising hunting rights on their own reservations. In response, Gov. Stitt brought an application for an original action in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, seeking to overturn Attorney General Drummond’s opinion.[xxx]

On March 24, 2026, the Oklahoma Supreme Court unanimously rejected the governor’s application, concluding that the dispute was already pending in federal court and fundamentally was a matter of federal law, and thus tribal jurisdiction and comity counseled in favor of deferring to the federal court’s determination. Several justices filed short concurring opinions, including one by Chief Justice Rowe, joined by Justice Kane, which noted that “[t]he federal court is not bound by the reasoning of [AG Drummond’s] Opinion and can reject the analysis of federal law on which the Opinion relies. Once the federal court resolves this question, its decision – grounded in federal law – will likewise settle state question[s] addressed in the Opinion.”[xxxi]

CONCLUSION

Alicia Stroble’s case was a pivotal moment in the post-McGirt legal landscape. It tested whether states can disregard federal Indian law in civil contexts. The U.S. Supreme Court may ultimately decide these federal preemption issues in another future case, particularly on still percolating civil-regulatory hunting and fishing rights challenges. Though many expected it would be, Stroble was ultimately not that vehicle.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Mike McBride III chairs Crowe & Dunlevy’s Indian Law & Gaming Practice in Tulsa. He is a former tribal supreme court justice, attorney general, federal adjunct settlement judge and law professor. Mr. McBride is also a past chair of the OBA’s and Federal Bar Association’s Indian Law sections.

 

 

 

 

Jeff D. Trevillion is a director in the Oklahoma City office of Crowe & Dunlevy and a member of the firm’s Taxation Practice Group. He is an experienced trial lawyer and a certified public accountant who also chairs the White Collar, Compliance & Investigations practice. He is a fellow of the American College of Tax Counsel and currently serves as member-at-large of the OBA Board of Governors.  

 

 

 

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ENDNOTES

[i] 2025 OK 48, —P.3d – (petition for certiorari filed on Sept. 29, 2025, No. 25-382, petition denied, April 6, 2026).

[ii] McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct.. 2452, 207 L.Ed.2d 985 (2020).

[iii] Application of the Oklahoma Individual Income Tax to Native Americans, OAC 710:50-15-2(b), cites the qualifying factors for tribal income exemption from Oklahoma Tax and incorporates the “Indian country” definition in 18 U.S.C. 1151, specifically addressed in the McGirt decision.

[iv] Okla. Admin. Code §710:50-15-2.

[v] In the Matter of the Income Tax Protest of Alecia Stroble, Case No T-21-014-S (April 12, 2022).

[vi] OTC Order No. 2022 10 04 14 (Oct. 5, 2022).

[vii] This includes the five large tribes with McGirt reservations that occupy most of eastern Oklahoma. The Cherokee, Chickasaw and Choctaw filed a joint amicus curiae briefs while the Seminole and Creek Nations filed separate amici curiae briefs.

[viii] McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).

[ix] 508 U.S. 114 (1993)(for the categorical prohibition on state taxation of an Indian citizen’s income to apply, “it is enough that the member live in ‘Indian country.’ Congress has defined Indian country broadly . . . . See 18 U.S.C. §1151” and “we ask only whether the land is Indian country” under Section 1151).

[x] See Supra note 3i.

[xi] OAC 710:50-15-2(a)(1).

[xii] See Supra note 1 at ¶10.

[xiii] Id. at ¶11 (endnote 3 omitted).

[xiv] Supra note 1, Rowe Concurrence ¶1,¶3,.

[xv] Id., Kuen Concurrence ¶1, ¶6, ¶7.

[xvi] Id., Winchester Concurrence ¶1, ¶4.

[xvii] Id., Darby Concurrence ¶1.

[xviii] Id., Kane Concurrence ¶37.

[xix] Id., Kane Concurrence ¶38.

[xx] Id., Kane Concurrence ¶42.

[xxi] Id. Dissent.

[xxii] Alicia Stroble v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, No. 25-382.

[xxiii] National Congress of American Indians, United South and Eastern Tribes Sovereignty Protection Fund, Native American Finance Officers Association, and the National Intertribal Tax Alliance – Amicus Brief, No 2025-382, 6.

[xxiv] Seminole Nation Amicus Brief, No. 2025-382, 5.

[xxv] DeCoteau v. Dist. Cnty. Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975); Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993); Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998); Mustang Production Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382 (1996), certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1288, 520 U.S. 1139, 137 L.Ed.2d 364 (1997) (involving the Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma).

[xxvi] For scholarship, see Stacy Leeds and Lonnie Beard, A Wealth of Sovereign Choices: Tax Implications of McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Promise of Tribal Economic Development, 56 Tulsa L. Rev. 417 (2021).

[xxvii] Wade Free, et. al. and Gov. Kevin Stitt v. Gentner Drummond, MA-123759 (Okla.) mandamus action filed on Jan. 27, 2026, ¶25-38, recounting the rapidly increasing legal tensions in the fall of 2025 over state game wardens and a special prosecutor enforcing state civil hunting license requirements on Native Americans on the reservation. Governor Stitt relied upon subsequent state court rulings including the Stroble, and City of Tulsa v. O’Brien, -- P.3d ---, 2024 OK CR 31, 2024 WL 5001684 decisions, as well as the post-McGirt decision of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629 (2022) to support enforcement.

[xxviii] See Cherokee Nation v. Free, et. al., No. 25-cv-630-CVE-JFJ (N.D. Okla.) (Complaint filed Nov. 18, 2025). The lawsuit is pending on a request for a preliminary and permanent injunction. On June 11, 2026, the court denied Oklahoma’s motions to dismiss finding that “colorable claims that it has treaty rights” and directed the parties to propose a scheduling order by June 25, 2026, to resolve the case.  The companion case is Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Free, No. 26-CV-0003-CVE-JFJ (N.D. Okla.)(similar claims and ruling also on June 11, 2026).  .

[xxix] OK AG OP 2025-19 (Dec. 18, 2025) (AG Drummond opined that federal law preempts state application of the Oklahoma Wildlife Conservation Code to tribal members hunting and fishing on the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw reservations. The opinion, which explicitly noted that certain tax and civil rulings do not apply (including the Stroble and O’Brien decisions) prohibit the state from requiring licenses or prosecuting Native Americans for wildlife activities on their respective reservations). His opinion is available at https://bit.ly/4fgP90l On May 13, 2024, in Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. City of Henryetta, OK, No. 25-CV-227-JAR (E.D. Okla.) the district court enjoined the city from prosecuting an Indian, whether member or non-member for conduct occurring within Indian country absent explicit congressional authorization. The district court refused to rely on the state appellate decision in O’Brien or Castro-Huerta. In short, the court wrote “[w]hen federal and state law conflict, state law yields.” Sl. op. at 3. https://bit.ly/4wHmEzM.

[xxx] Wade Free, et. al. and Gov. Kevin Stitt v. Gentner Drummond, MA-123759 (Okla.) mandamus action filed on Jan. 27, 2026.

[xxxi] Id. at ¶2. Justice Kuehn concurred in the result noting that “[t]his Court has no jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions” and should therefore decline to assume original jurisdiction. Id. at ¶1. Justice Jett, joined by Justice Winchester noted that the litigation needed factual development and the federal court had the matter in hand. Id. at ¶1 & ¶5. They also noted that the AG Opinions are “merely advisory”. Id. at ¶2 & ¶5.

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Originally published in the Oklahoma Bar Journal – OBJ 97 No. 6 (August 2026)

Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff.