Oklahoma Bar Journal
The Use and Abuse of Hearsay in Family Law Matters
By Jessica Tueller and Monica Dionisio
In November 2025, 12 O.S. §2803.3 entered into effect, creating an exception to the hearsay rule for statements pertaining to domestic abuse.[1] Specifically, this section provides:
A statement that purports to narrate, describe, report, or explain an incident or incidents of domestic abuse as defined in Section 60.1 of Title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes:
- Made by the victim of domestic abuse to a law enforcement officer within one (1) week of the incident;
- On an application for a protective order by the victim of domestic abuse within one (1) week of the incident; or
- Given as testimony of the victim of domestic abuse made at a hearing on application for a protective order,
shall be admissible in pre-trial or post-trial criminal and juvenile delinquent domestic abuse prosecutions including preliminary hearings, prosecutive merit hearings, or hearings on the revocation of probation or acceleration of a deferred judgment.[2]
An earlier article in this journal raised constitutional and other concerns about the implications of this provision for criminal proceedings, to which the section is most immediately applicable.[3] The article also flagged that, although the provision “is inapplicable to family and domestic matters,” it might indirectly affect matters such as child custody and visitation.[4] Specifically, the article suggested that the interaction of 12 O.S. §2803.3 with 43 O.S. §109.3 (which requires evidence of domestic abuse to be considered in custody and visitation proceedings), might facilitate the indirect introduction of these out-of-court statements into civil proceedings.[5] Although this issue has not yet been litigated due to how recently this provision was passed, practitioners expect that this statute will raise new evidentiary challenges in family matters.
Even as the legislature has made moves that appear to make hearsay more flexible in family matters, certain legislators have put forward bills that propose to restrict the admissibility of hearsay in family law proceedings. In the second session of the 60th Legislature (2026), SB 1760 was introduced, which would amend 10A O.S. §1-4-601 to eliminate the use of hearsay in deprived proceedings, as well as raise the standard of proof in these proceedings from the preponderance of the evidence to beyond a reasonable doubt.[6] At the same time, in the House, HB 3484 was introduced, which, among other things, would amend 10A O.S. §1-4-203 to prohibit the admission of hearsay in review hearings concerning the removal of children by the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, and raise the standard of proof in these hearings from preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence.[7] Although neither bill has made it out of committee, these proposals demonstrate that there are competing impulses in the Legislature when it comes to hearsay and family law.
This article draws on both Oklahoma evidence law and federal constitutional law to contextualize these diverging developments. In doing so, this article aims to inform practitioners of the existing balance of rights and interests, as well as to anticipate how changes like 12 O.S. §2803.3 could present new challenges that potentially disrupt that balance.
OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE LAW
Developments such as 12 O.S. §2803.3 must be understood in the broader context of Oklahoma evidence law, and specifically how Oklahoma evidence law intersects with family law. Across the U.S., family courts’ approach to hearsay in proceedings affecting children is far more flexible than the approach of courts in other contexts, such as criminal proceedings.[8]
One of the driving forces behind the relaxation of evidence rules in family matters is the desire to hear from children without including them in the proceedings. Rarely does a family court call the affected child to give evidence.[9] Instead, hearsay is often admitted through a range of general hearsay exceptions, most notably the exceptions for present sense impressions, excited utterances, state of mind, statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment, and recorded recollections.[10]
Hearsay statements, from children as well as other sources, often arrive in front of family courts via in camera interviews or via the admission of reports by guardians ad litem.[11] Both methods have long been used in Oklahoma to facilitate the court’s assessment of children’s experiences and preferences. Evidence of domestic abuse of the sort admitted pursuant to 12 O.S. §2803.1 may find their way into admission in family law cases both in the courtroom and by way of these mechanisms.
In Camera Interviews
In camera interviews – that is, private sessions where the judge asks questions of a child – have become the mechanism by which children may testify directly when expressing a preference as to custody and/or visitation.[12] No specific age is set by statute. Instead, it is left to the judge’s discretion whether the child will be permitted to give evidence in this manner. Because they are not parties to the litigation, these statements are not subject to characterization as non-hearsay, as defined by the Oklahoma Evidence Code.[13]
Not only are family courts allowed to give weight to evidence gathered in this manner, but they are also allowed to conduct in camera interviews in chambers without the parents or their attorneys present.[14] In Hogue v. Hogue[15], a mother challenged, among other things, the weight placed upon her son’s testimony and the exclusion of the parties’ attorneys from the in camera testimony of the parties’ son.[16] The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed that the preference of the parties’ son was intelligent and articulate and was carefully considered by the trial court.[17] The appellate court further found the trial court was justified in excluding the parties’ attorneys based on the trial court’s belief the child would be more open and candid without the attorneys present.[18]
Parents may not only be excluded from the in camera interviews, but they may also be denied later access to the interview transcript. In Ynclan v. Woodward, the court set forth guidelines for trial court’s interviews of children in camera and held that, absent an appeal by either party, due process does not require either parent to have access to the transcript.[19] The Court of Civil Appeals enumerated at length the purposes of conducting the in camera interview in private, including but not limited to elimination of the harm to a child from exposure to direct and cross examination, enhanced candor and minimization of trauma.[20] Relevant to this article, the court also addressed the balance of the concepts of the adversarial system and the due process rights of parents against the welfare of the child and the court’s interest in hearing the child.[21] Interestingly, the Court of Civil Appeals also addresses a child’s freedom of expression and their right to a degree of privacy that preserves that freedom.[22]
In a concurring opinion, Justice Taylor and Justice Opala further emphasized the preservation of basic fundamental due process in child custody proceedings, both for children and parents.[23] Notably, the focus of the concurring opinion rests on the preliminary requirement of the trial court to decide whether the best interests of the child are served by an in camera interview and, upon objection by a parent, the conducting of a full hearing where objections are heard a clear ruling is made and reflected in the appellate record.[24] In contrast, a dissent by Justice Watt pointed to what he perceived to be a major error in the majority’s ruling that the transcripts will be made available to parents upon a mere intent to appeal.[25] Justice Watt reasoned that the transcripts should remain sealed and subject to viewing only by the trial court and the appellate court, ensuring due process for parents but not jeopardizing the trust and well-being of children.[26] He further stated that this requirement would further the weaponizing of children in family law cases.[27] Neither the majority nor the concurring and dissenting justices, however, addressed the ongoing effect of such heavy reliance upon hearsay itself and the parents’ lack of opportunity to challenge it in an evidentiary sense.
The variety of hearsay involved in the testimony of children has and continues to make substantial impact in family law cases. In Lowry v. Lewis,[28] the court undertook an appeal wherein a mother alleged the preference of the child (expressed in camera) was not, on its own, sufficient to justify a change in custody. Distinguishing the issue of modification from an original custody decision, the court affirmed prior cases that found it is unnecessary for a parent to meet the burden of proof for modification of custody in Gibbons v. Gibbons[29] as long as the child’s preference is well-founded as set forth in Nazworth.[30]
While the courts continue to focus primarily on giving children with an intelligent preference a path to be heard within litigation, the balance of their rights and those of their parents continue to be a source of question and conflict. The process set forth in 43 O.S. §113 does protect children from being forced to testify in front of adversarial parents; however, it does not insulate children from being coached by one or both parents prior to the interview and therefore does not ensure the preference is free of influence of litigating parents at war over physical and legal custodial rights. The process often also leaves even those parents who behave in good faith with more questions than answers and without access to the kind of evidentiary proof otherwise provided in support of legal rulings.
Guardians ad Litem
It is also not uncommon for a guardian ad litem to be appointed, even where the court is willing to hear from children directly prior to, during or after trial prior to ruling. Where a guardian ad litem is appointed, they are required to be present with the child in chambers during the child’s in camera interview, but their role expands to include much more than mere presence in the courtroom.[31]
Since 1997, 43 O.S. §107.3 has enabled trial courts to appoint guardians ad litem (hereafter referred to as GALs).[32] The GAL is an officer of the court, appointed to “objectively advocate on behalf of the child.”[33] The GAL is vested with a number of investigative responsibilities and submits factual reports with their findings to the court to assist the court in determining the best interests of the child.[34] The GAL is required to maintain “as much as possible” confidentiality and is not subject to discovery.[35]
The GAL reports occupy a unique place in Oklahoma evidence law. While the best interest determinations remain with the trial court, the GAL’s findings are often the mechanism by which information outside the court comes in, as well as the thoughts, feelings and preferences of the children who are the subject of the litigation.[36] The report could also include allegations of domestic abuse, specifically those of the type covered in 12 O.S. §2803.
A GAL is treated differently than any other witness in a case. As an “arm of the court”, a GAL is, by default, assumed to be neutral. Therefore, the amount of access they have to the investigative process and sensitive information must be weighed against the fact that they cannot be subjected to discovery, including depositions. This routinely results in ripe disputes about the propriety of evidence being admitted and the proper weight to give the GAL’s findings and any recommendations made as to custody and visitation, which often include child hearsay and the hearsay of third parties who are collateral witnesses, either directly or by the GAL’s reliance on the hearsay statements in findings and/or recommendations.
Despite the GALs’ neutral role, parents have attempted to use GALs as tools in gaining an advantage, attempting to sway the GAL to or away from the parent’s position. This often involves voluminous correspondence and unreasonably long lists of collateral witnesses. It can also manifest in a parent’s discontent with a GAL’s findings and/or recommendations becoming the basis for terminating payment to the GAL, leading to a GAL’s release from the case before a decision on the merits can ever be issued and leaving the original void of opportunity for the child’s best interests and/or preference to be heard.
12 O.S. §2803.3
There is now the possibility that 12 O.S. §2803.3 will compound these challenges in expediting the effect of statements made nearly automatically admissible by 12 O.S. §2803.3, even before a finding of domestic violence can be made.
Protective order matters may, but are not required to, be consolidated into domestic matters.[37] While they often are, emergency orders are frequently entered prior to that consolidation occurring, and it can be weeks or months before the case makes it to the domestic judge’s courtroom.
Now, with 12 O.S. §2803.3 coming into effect, statements classified as those purporting “to narrate, describe, report, or explain an incident or incidents of domestic abuse”[38] can be entered into evidence in an emergency protective order proceeding (or a permanent one if the case is not consolidated). The result is that these statements become part of an official court record before the trier of fact in the domestic case has had any opportunity to weigh it with other evidence or gauge the credibility of the party making such statements, despite being the judge making a best interest determination.
There is a risk that filing of protective order actions will be made not only by victims in need of legal protections and safety, but also by parents seeking advantage in domestic cases and a way to deprive the other parent or guardian of custodial rights and privileges. Parents have already tried to leverage the relaxation of evidence rules in family matters when faced with in camera interviews and GALs. Practitioners should be aware that parents may try to take advantage of this relaxation of evidence rules with regard to protective orders as well, necessarily impacting family law proceedings as a whole.
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Exceptions to hearsay, though regularly invoked and applied in family proceedings affecting children, remain cause for concern about due process rights under the 14th Amendment.[39] As seen above, Oklahoma courts have already begun to consider how to balance the relevant rights and interests in the context of in camera interviews. Practitioners should expect that this same balancing will need to occur if 12 O.S. §2803.3 finds its way, as has been predicted, into family proceedings.
In this context, procedural due process rights as well as the substantive due process right of the parents to care and control of children are balanced against the government’s interest in the welfare of children. U.S. courts tend not to entertain arguments about children’s constitutional rights, instead vesting these rights exclusively in the children’s parents.[40]
Parental Rights
The 14th Amendment protects both a parents’ procedural due process rights and their substantive due process right to the custody, care, and control of their children. This right was first articulated in Meyer and Pierce,[41] and has been more recently reaffirmed in decisions like Troxel, which pointed to a long line of cases in which the Supreme Court of the United States has “recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”[42]
Fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny.[43] This does not mean that the government cannot regulate or can never interfere with parental decision-making with regard to the custody, care, and control of children.[44] It simply means that such a government action, to be upheld as constitutional, must be a narrowly tailored means of achieving a compelling government interest.[45]
Compelling Interest
Child welfare is a compelling government interest. Each state government has a parens patriae power that enables it to take actions that protect individuals who are not competent to act on their own behalf.[46] Although the origins of the parens patriae power in common-law England were somewhat limited, it has expanded over time to give vast powers for states to act on behalf of these individuals, including children.[47] When exercising this power on behalf of a child or other incompetent individual, the state generally tries to make the decisions that the individual would make if fully competent.[48]
The interest in the welfare of the child is twofold here. First, the court needs to ensure that the outcome of the proceedings will be in the best interest of the child.[49] The best interest of the child is a fact-intensive assessment that requires the court to gather information about the child’s perspective, relationships, and experiences. To do this, the court must hear from the child, provided they have reached a certain age or level of maturity.[50] In Oklahoma custody proceedings, trial courts are found to err when they do not to permit children with an intelligent preference to express them.[51] In camera interviews and GALs serve the interest in child welfare by enabling the court to assess the child’s preferences.
As part of the best interests assessment, the court must also “consider evidence of domestic abuse, stalking and/or harassing behavior properly brought before it” and moreover must apply “a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interest of the child to have custody, guardianship, or unsupervised visitation granted to the person against whom domestic abuse, stalking or harassing behavior has been established.”[52] Such evidence could be obtained via in camera interviews and GALs. The admission of protective order statements under 12 O.S. §2803.3 represents an additional avenue to obtaining potentially helpful information about domestic abuse.
Second, the court needs to protect the well-being of the child during the proceedings. The government does not want the child to be drawn too much into the conflict of their parents or the adversarial system of the court.[53] The government may also be concerned about how children who are victims of abuse might be revictimized by the legal process.[54] But even in custody cases where the child has not been abused, the judge is concerned about protecting the child from traumatization resulting from the legal proceedings.[55] Ensuring that the child does not have to testify in open court is one way of shielding them from what could be a traumatizing experience.[56] In camera interviews and GALs are thought to shield the child from conflict and trauma, but the admission of protective order statements under 12 O.S. §2803.3 might be considered to do the same since the child would seemingly not be required to corroborate the evidence.
Narrowly Tailored Means
There are several explanations for why the rules of evidence could be relaxed in family law proceedings, while still being a narrowly tailored interference with parental rights. First, juries are rare in the family court and judges are more trusted to assess reliability accurately and fairly.[57] Second, as a practical matter, hearsay is sometimes the only way – or at least the only way that will not be unduly time-consuming and costly – to access crucial and comprehensive information about the best interest of a child.[58] This practical concern is especially pressing in cases involving child sexual abuse.[59]
There is a danger, however, of relaxing the rules too much, in ways that are neither good nor necessary.[60] Timothy M. Tippins & Lauren K. DeLuca have asserted that the result of this relaxation is the “destruction of evidentiary integrity, the erosion of the trial process, and the immolation of due process on the altar of expediency.”[61] If hearsay statements arriving in court via in camera interviews and the GALs are already cause for concern both about due process rights and about the reliability of evidence, the admission of protective orders statements as evidence without any additional safeguards will likely be fertile ground for constitutional challenges. Practitioners should be aware of this possibility and consider presenting additional grounds for admissibility of evidence to protect cases on appeal.
As discussed in a previous article,[62] the Oklahoma Legislature had to address a similar issue after the passage of 28 O.S. §2803.1, a statute also located in the Oklahoma Evidence Code. The statute addresses hearsay statements by children, incapacitated persons or vulnerable adults used in criminal prosecution proceedings.[63] As originally written, it was successfully challenged (see Foote v. State)[64] based upon violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and its application formulated in Crawford v. Washington.[65] The Oklahoma Legislature, upon recommendation of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Foote, amended the statute later in 2023 to comply with the confrontation clause and avoid future reversals.
Now, outside of juvenile deprived proceedings and pre- and post-trial criminal and juvenile delinquent proceedings, statements made by a child not yet 16 years of age can only be admitted if that child, incapacitated person or vulnerable adult testifies at trial. If the witness does not testify at trial, they must be unavailable and the requirements for admissibility met pursuant to 12 O.S. §2804(B). Otherwise, the statement can only be admitted if it is nontestimonial.[66]
28 O.S. Section 2803.3 provides no such protections, leaving wide open the door for constitutional challenges. The statute would be similarly well served by implementation of similar conditions for admissibility, putting all parties in a case on notice about the standards by which these statements may be admitted. Said conditions would narrow the statute and provide protections which protect due process rights of litigants while still serving the purposes for which it was authored.
CONCLUSION
One significant effect of 12 O.S. §2803.3 to domestic matters is that, as it is currently written, statements made by adults or children in the course of domestic violence proceedings will also be admissible without evidentiary safeguards otherwise available. It is likely, if not inevitable, that the number of Oklahoma appeals will increase as a result. Practitioners should consider whether to challenge the admission of this evidence when it appears and should also be careful not to leave their own evidence open to easy challenge.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Monica A. Dionisio is a partner at Dionisio Sherwood. She represents clients in all areas of family law and is a fellow in the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.
Jessica Tueller is an associate professor of law at the OU College of Law. Professor Tueller writes and teaches in the areas of family law; contracts; gender; sexuality and the law; and international law.
[1] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §2803.3.
[2] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §2803.3.
[3] Virginia D. Henson, Margaret A. East and Mahak H. Merchant, “Admissible at What Cost? Senate Bill 607 and Its Constitutional Concerns,” 97 Oklahoma Bar Journal, 22 (2026).
[4] Id. at 24.
[5] Id. at 26.
[6] S.B. 1670, 60th Leg. §§1-2 (Okla. 2026).
[7] H.B. 3434, 60th Leg. §2 (Okla. 2026).
[8] Linda D. Elrod, “Hearsay and Custody: The Twice Told Story,” 21 Family Law Quarterly, 169, 169 (1987).
[9] Patrick Parkinson and Judy Cashmore, The Voice of a Child in Family Law Disputes, 2 (2008).
[10] Steven N. Peskind, “Evidentiary Opportunities: Applicability of the Hearsay Rules in Child Custody Proceedings,” 25 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, 375, 375, 388–95 (2013).
[11] Steven N. Peskind, “Evidentiary Opportunities: Applicability of the Hearsay Rules in Child Custody Proceedings,” 25 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, 375, 395–97 (2013); Linda D. Elrod, Hearsay and Custody: The Twice Told Story, Family Law Quarterly. 169, 185 (1987); see also Timothy M. Tippins and Lauren K. DeLuca, “The Custody Evaluator Meets Hearsay: A Star-Crossed Romance,” 30 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 521 (2018); Resa M. Gilats, “Out-of-Court Statements in Guardian Ad Litem Written Reports and Oral Testimony,” 33 William Mitchell Law Review, 911 (2007); Patrick Parkinson and Judy Cashmore, The Voice of a Child in Family Law Disputes, 2 (2008).
[12] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §113(E).
[13] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §2804.
[14] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §113.
[15] 2008 OK CIV APP 63, 190 P.3d 1177.
[16] Id. at ¶4.
[17] Id. at ¶8.
[18]Id. at ¶12.
[19] 2010 OK 29, 237 P.3d 145.
[20] Id. at ¶12.
[21] Id. ¶14, 16, ¶20.
[22] Id. at ¶23.
[23] Id., Opala and Taylor, JJ. concurring at ¶1.
[24] Id. at ¶4-5.
[25] Id., Watt, J. dissenting at ¶2.
[26] Id. at ¶3-4.
[27] Id. at ¶8.
[28] 2014 OK CIV APP 9, 317 P.3d 230.
[29] 1968 OK 77, 442 P.2d 482.
[30] 1996 OK CIV APP 134, 931 P.2d 86.
[31] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §113(4).
[32] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §107.3.
[33] Id.
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §60.2.
[38] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §2803.3.
[39] Robert G. Spector and Virginia D. Henson, Oklahoma Family Law, the Handbook, 407 (2025-2026).
[40] David D. Meyer, “The Modest Promise of Children’s Relationship Rights,” 11 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 1117 (2003) (“Adults now have well-established constitutional rights to establish and maintain vital family relationships. Children do not.”); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (“We have never had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship. We need not do so here[.]”). Framing this solely as within the government’s discretion due to the parens patriae power of the state to regulate on behalf of children, as opposed required to respect and ensure the rights of children, contrast with the approach of other countries. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which most nation-states other than the U.S. are party, provides in Article 12 that children have a right to be heard “in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.” Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 12, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
[41] Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
[42] Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
[43] Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503–04 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
[44] Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
[45] Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972)
[46] Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).
[47] Douglas E. Abrams, A Very Special Place in Life: The History of Juvenile Justice in Missouri, 4–6 (2003).
[48] “Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family,” 93 Harvard Law Review, 1156, 1199 n.14 (1980).
[49] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §109(A).
[50] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §113.
[51] Bishop v. Benear, 1928 OK 553, ¶ 24, 132 Okla. 116, 270 P. 569, 572.
[52] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §109.3.
[53] Patrick Parkinson and Judy Cashmore, “The Voice of A Child in Family Law Disputes,” 2, 14 (2008); Robert G. Spector and Virginia D. Henson, Oklahoma Family Law: The Handbook (2025-2026).
[54] Nancy Schleifer, “Might versus Fright: The Confrontation Clause and the Search for Truth in the Child Abuse Family Court Case,” 16 Nova Law Review 783, 788–89 (1992).
[55] Jaqueline Clarke, “Do I Have A Voice - An Empirical Analysis of Children's Voices in Michigan Custody Litigation,” 47 Family Law Quarterly, 457, 457 (2013).
[56] Jaqueline Clarke, “Do I Have A Voice - An Empirical Analysis of Children's Voices in Michigan Custody Litigation,” 47 Family Law Quarterly, 457, 457 (2013).
[57] Steven N. Peskind, Evidentiary Opportunities: Applicability of the Hearsay Rules in Child Custody Proceedings, 25 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, 375, 397 (2013); Linda D. Elrod, “Hearsay and Custody: The Twice Told Story,” 21 Family Law Quarterly 169, 170 n.7 (1987) (“With the exception of Texas, as custody cases are tried to the court without a jury.”).
[58] Steven N. Peskind, “Evidentiary Opportunities: Applicability of the Hearsay Rules in Child Custody Proceedings,” 25 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 375, 397 (2013); Mark Hardin, “Child Protection Cases in a Unified Family Court,” 32 Family Law Quarterly. 147, 179 (1988).
[59] John E. B. Myers, “Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visitation Litigation: Recommendations for Improved Fact Finding and Child Protection,” 28 [[SC]] Journal of Family Law. [[/SC]] 1, 6 (1989-1990).
[60] See, e.g., Dale Margolin Cecka, “Don’t Just Ask the Kids: Toward a More Deliberate Approach to Child Advocacy,” 85 Maryland Law Review. 696, 722–23 (2026).
[61] Timothy M. Tippins & Lauren K. DeLuca, “The Custody Evaluator Meets Hearsay: A Star-Crossed Romance,” 30 Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 521, 558 (2018).
[62] Virginia D. Henson, Margaret A. East and Mahak H. Merchant, “Admissible at What Cost? Senate Bill 607 and Its Constitutional Concerns,” 97 Oklahoma Bar Journal 22 (2026).
[63] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §2803.1.
[64] 2023 OK CR 12, ¶15, 533 P.3d 354, 360.
[65] 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
[66] Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §2803.1(B).
Originally published in the Oklahoma Bar Journal – OBJ 97 No. 6 (August 2026)
Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff.