THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL 46 | AUGUST 2026 Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff. 7. See Wade v. Reimer, 1961 OK 44, ¶5, 359 P.2d 1071 (involving a statute which required a vehicle be operated at a careful and prudent speed not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper); cf. Smith, 2017 OK CIV APP at ¶¶21-23 (involving a statute requiring that a vehicle yield the right-of-way, while turning on a steady red light, to a pedestrian and other traffic lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk). 8. Smith, 2017 OK CIV APP at ¶29. 9. See Orthman v. Premiere Pediatrics, PLLC, 2024 OK CIV APP 7, 545 P.3d 124, 134 (approved for publication by the Oklahoma Supreme Court); see also Armstrong v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 2023 WL 359519, Case No. 22-CV-377-CVEJFJ, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 23, 2023) (dismissing negligence per se because “the statute fails to provide any positive objective standards that can easily be applied to determine if a defendant’s conduct violates the statute, and the finder of fact would be required to evaluate the facts and apply ordinary negligence principles to determine if the defendant violated a tort duty to the plaintiff”). 10. See, e.g., Ibarra v. Gastelum, 249 Ariz. 493, 471 P.3d 1028, 1030-31 (where the Arizona Court of Appeals explained that “Negligence per se is limited to situations involving a specific legal requirement, not a general standard of care. To provide the basis for a negligence per se claim, a statute must proscribe certain or specific acts … Therefore, if a statute defines only a general standard of care … negligence per se is inappropriate.”) (cleaned up); Boyd v. Moore, 919 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (where the Ohio Court of Appeals stated in simple terms, if “a determination of statutory compliance requires a subjective analysis,” negligence per se will not apply); Supreme Beef Packers, Inc. v. Maddox, 67 S.W.3d 453, 456 (Tex. App. 2002) (where the Texas Court of Appeals stated that, “Where a statute incorporates the ordinarily prudent person standard, negligence per se does not apply because the statute does not establish a specific standard of conduct different than the common-law standard of ordinary care. In those cases, it is redundant to submit a question on the statutory standard or to instruct the jury regarding it, and the negligence per se standard is subsumed under the broad-form negligence question.”) (cleaned up); see also Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining the same for Tennessee law); Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.4th 814, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 756, 927 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1997) (explaining the same for California law); Borns ex rel. Gannon v. Voss, 70 P.3d 262 (Wyo. 2003) (explaining the same for Wyoming law). 11. Smith, 2017 OK CIV APP at ¶29. 12. Murry v. Advanced Asphalt Co., 1987 OK CIV APP 88, ¶¶8-12, 751 P.2d 209. 13. Id. 14. Id. 15. Lazy S Ranch Properties, LLC v. Valero Terminaling and Distribution Company et al., 92 F.4th 1189, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2024). 16. Id. 17. Id. (citing BP Pipelines (N. Am.) Inc. v. C.D. Brown Const., Inc., 473 F. App’x 818, 828 (10th Cir. 2012). 18. Id. 19. Murry v. Advanced Asphalt Co., 1987 OK CIV APP at ¶¶8-12, 751 P.2d 209; Lazy S Ranch Properties, LLC v. Valero Terminaling and Distribution Company et al., 92 F.4th at 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2024). 20. Orthman, 2024 OK CIV APP at ¶24. 21. Id; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Pitchford, 1914 OK 79, 143 P. 1146 (court syllabus). 22. Wade, 1961 OK at ¶5. 23. Id. 24. Id. 25. Id. 26. Id. 27. Id; see also Conway v. Lone Star Transp., LLC, 2020 WL 609750, at *3 (N.D. Okla. 2020) (holding that “driving a vehicle ‘in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property’ is not a positive objective standard”). 28. Athey v. Bingham, 1991 OK 82, ¶9, 823 P.2d 346 (citing Agee v. Grant, 1966 OK 31, 412 P.2d 155) (where Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that a statute requiring drivers to be able to stop within clear distance depends on physical conditions at the time and place; whether the statute was violated depends on the circumstances proved).
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