THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL 44 | AUGUST 2026 Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff. strong to prevent parting of the trailer from the drawing vehicle,” and the court determined that towing a trailer without these required safety chains constituted negligence per se.13 Despite this somewhat qualitative language about chain strength, the Court of Civil Appeals determined that the statutory requirement was fixed enough to establish a clear duty.14 Consider also, for example, 27 O.S. §2-6-105(A), which the 10th Circuit, applying Oklahoma law, determined to be a viable basis for a negligence per se claim in Lazy S Ranch Properties, LLC v. Valero Terminaling and Distribution Company.15 Section 2-6-105(A) prevents pollution of any waters of the state, with the statute’s declaration of policy stating that it is public policy to provide that no waste or pollutant be discharged into any waters of the state or otherwise placed in a location likely to affect such waters.16 The 10th Circuit not only allowed such standard to support a negligence per se claim here, but explained that the court had previously recognized that this specific statute may impose a duty to prevent pollution under Oklahoma law.17 This holding underscores the type of statutory language capable of supporting negligence per se: a clear, affirmative prohibition that does not depend on case-by-case determinations of reasonableness. Unlike statutes that hinge on subjective qualifiers, §2-6-105(A) establishes a concrete, enforceable standard: Pollution is simply not permitted.18 In that sense, liability turns on whether a discharge occurred and whether it affected protected waters, not on whether the defendant acted “reasonably” under the circumstances. Accordingly, Lazy S Ranch illustrates how statutes framed as categorical prohibitions or mandates are far more likely to satisfy the objective standard requirement necessary to sustain a negligence per se claim. From a practical standpoint, Murry and Lazy S provide a useful blueprint for crafting viable negligence per se claims. First, counsel should identify statutes that impose concrete, affirmative duties, such as requirements for specific conduct or to refrain from specific conduct.19 These statutes often contain language tied to observable or testable conditions (e.g., presence of equipment, compliance with numerical thresholds, or adherence to defined procedures). Second, the statutory violation should be capable of proof independent of a broader reasonableness analysis. If proving the violation requires the same type of evidence and argument similar to common law negligence, such as whether conduct was “reasonable under the circumstances,” the claim likely collapses into ordinary negligence.20 Third, attorneys should frame the claim around the statute’s specific mandate, emphasizing how the defendant’s conduct failed to meet that mandate in a clear, binary way.21 IDENTIFYING SUBJECTIVE STANDARDS TO CHALLENGE NEGLIGENCE PER SE CLAIMS When challenging a negligence per se claim, through a dismissal motion or a summary judgment motion, attorneys should be cognizant of the subjective standards that may make the referenced statute inapplicable for supporting a negligence per se claim. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma gave clear guidance on this principle in Wade v. Reimer, where the court considered the applicability of In the end, the story of negligence per se is not one of automatic liability simply because a statute is cited, but of careful line-drawing between rules and standards.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy OTk3MQ==