THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL 46 | APRIL 2026 Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff. 20. Id. at 556 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 21. Id. 22. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 552. 23. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). 24. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 553; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and (d). 25. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 553. 26. Id. 27. Id. 28. Id. at 555. 29. Id. 30. Id. 31. Id. at 552; see also Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U.S. 761, 774, 775 (2019) (Plurality Op.) (listing “civil procedure” in federal court as an example of the court applying its “modern field preemption doctrine”); accord id. at 781 (Ginsburg, Kagan and Sotomayor, JJ., concurring) (agreeing with lead opinion on that issue). 32. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 554-55. 33. See id. 34. 480 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987). 35. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 553. 36. E.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399, 401 (2012) (holding that when a federal occupies a field, “even complementary state regulation is impermissible”) (emphasis added). 37. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) (Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to promote an important federal interest of ensuring uniformity of proceedings in federal court); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5-7 (state law had to yield because it disrupted the mode of operation of a controlling federal rule). 38. Ramos v. Luisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 104 (2020) (Plurality Op.) (It is, after all, the “ratio decidendi – that allows ... [a judicial opinion] to have life and effect in the disposition of future cases.”) (emphasis added); Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U. S. 119, 136 (2019) (the ratio – “the reasoning underlying” the holding – is “just as binding as [the] holding.”) (emphasis added); see also In re Est. of Bleeker, 2007 OK 68, ¶14, n. 25, 168 P.3d 774, 781 (“The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion.”) (emphasis added). 39. See Stokes v. Sw. Airlines, 887 F.3d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Antonin Scalia, “The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,” 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1177 (1989) (lower courts are bound by a higher appellate court’s mode of analysis); accord Kivett v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 154 F.4th 640, 645 (9th Cir. 2025); United States v. Brooks, 751 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2014) (circuit precedent is not binding “when the Supreme Court issues an intervening decision that is contrary to or invalidates our previous analysis.”) (cleaned up). 40. See, e.g., Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have said that this court considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when the dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later statements.”) (emphasis added). 41. Anagnost v. Tomacek, 2017 OK 7, ¶8, 390 P.3d 707, 710; Krimbill v. Talarico, 2018 OK CIV APP 37, ¶5, 417 P.3d 1240, 1244-45. 42. See Krimbill, 2018 OK CIV APP 37, ¶14, 439 P.3d at 1246. 43. Id. ¶11, 439 P.3d at 434-35; see also 12 O.S. §1434 (c). 44. See 12 O.S. §1434 (c) compare with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) and (c); cf. Anderson v. Wilken, 2016 OK CIV APP 35, ¶4, 377 P.3d 149, 151 (in an anti-SLAPP motion, “none of these standards” – i.e., taking facts alleged as true – “apply”). 45. See 12 O.S. §1432(C); id. §1435 (B). 46. See 12 O.S. §1437 (right to immediate appeal) contrast with Anderson, 2016 OK CIV APP 35, ¶6, 377 P.3d at 151 (a denial of a motion to dismiss is not appealable); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988) (order denying motion to dismiss is not appealable). 47. Krimbill v. Talarico, 2018 OK CIV APP 37, ¶8, 417 P.3d 1240, 1245. 48. Id. (quoting 12 O.S. §1434(B)) (emphasis added). 49. Id. ¶28, 417 P.3d at 1248 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). 50. 12 O.S. §§1431(3), 1432. 51. Id. §§1431(7)(a-b) (emphasis added). 52. Krimbill, 2018 OK CIV APP 37, ¶8, 417 P.3d at 1245 (Oklahoma’s statute is “directed at protecting a wide spectrum of First Amendment speech, with limited exceptions.”); accord Lewis v. Corrente, 2020 OK CIV APP 45, ¶18, 473 P.3d 531, 535. 53. Krimbill, 2018 OK CIV APP 37, ¶8, 417 P.3d at 1245; 12 O.S. §1434(c). 54. S.W. Orthopaedic Spec. P.L.L.C. v. Allison, 2018 OK CIV APP 69, ¶13, 439 P.3d 430, 434 (A “dismissal based on a defense may be obtained only if the defense is one of law, not one requiring the court to [d]ecide disputed facts.”) (cleaned up). 55. Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 553-54. 56. Id. at 554. 57. See 12 O.S. §1434(c) compare with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) and (c); cf. Anderson, 2016 OK CIV APP 35, ¶4, 377 P.3d at 151 (in an anti-SLAPP motion, “none of these standards” – i.e., taking facts alleged as true – “apply”). 58. Berk, 2026 WL 135974, at *5 (cleaned up). 59. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) and (c); contrast with 12 O.S. §1434(c). 60. Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 553. 61. Id. 62. See 12 O.S. §1434 (B); id. §1435 (A). 63. See 12 O.S. §1434(c) compare with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) and (c); cf. Anderson, 2016 OK CIV APP 35, ¶4, 377 P.3d at 151 (in an OCPA motion, “none of these standards” – i.e., taking facts alleged as true – “apply”). 64. Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 563 (K. Jackson, J., concurring). 65. E.g., 12 O.S. §1432 (C) (discovery automatically stayed after anti-SLAPP motion is filed). 66. Id. §1435 (B). 67. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 5 (1986); Bryant v. O’Connor, 848 F.2d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1988). 68. Metabollic Research, Inc. v. Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795, 845 (9th Cir. 2012). 69. Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 555. 70. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (requiring a “reasonable opportunity to present all the [pertinent] material” if a motion to dismiss is converted to motion for summary judgment). 71. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (Federal “courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.”) (cleaned up). 72. See 12 O.S. §1434(c) compare with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) and (c); cf. Anderson, 2016 OK CIV APP 35, ¶4, 377 P.3d at 151 (in an anti-SLAPP motion, “none of these standards” – i.e., taking facts alleged as true – “apply”). 73. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 74. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 555. 75. E.g., Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 89-90 (1st Cir. 2010) (Maine anti-SLAPP statute); U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (“California has articulated the important, substantive state interests furthered by the Anti-SLAPP statute.”). 76. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 557. 77. Id. 78. Id. at 551. 79. Id. at 557. 80. Id. at 556-57. 81. Krimbill, 2018 OK CIV APP 37, ¶8, 417 P.3d at 1245; Lewis, 2020 OK CIV APP 45, ¶18, 473 P.3d at 535. 82. See Krimbill, 2018 OK CIV APP 37, ¶8, 417 P.3d at 1245. 83. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 552, 556-57. 84. Id. at 557. 85. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 86. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 87. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 553-54. 88. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 555; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 89. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 551. 90. See Berk, 146 S.Ct. at 552, 556-57.
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