THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL 24 | APRIL 2026 Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff. Oklahoma’s current forum-selection provisions mirror Delaware’s pre2025 framework, suggesting that similar updates could be adopted in the coming years. Additionally, with a lawsuit concerning the retroactive application of the safe harbor clause currently pending before the Delaware Supreme Court, these developments should be closely monitored.74 Like many other states, Oklahoma recognizes that a state legislature may not retroactively eliminate a cause of action that has already accrued or vested.75 Given the broad influence of the DGCL across states, the outcome of this litigation could reshape corporate governance norms nationwide. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Jinah Jung is an associate in the Oklahoma City office of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC. She received a Bachelor of Arts degree in 2015 from Hanyang University and a J.D. in 2025 from the OCU School of Law. ENDNOTES 1. Salzberg, et al. v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 116 (Del. 2020) (citing Edward P. Welch and Robert S. Saunders, “Freedom and Its Limits in the Delaware General Corporation Law,” 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 845, 856-60 (2008)). 2. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. (Del. 2025). 3. Johnson v. Brown, 2024 OK CIV APP 18, ¶42, 554 P.3d 781, 790 (approved for publ’n by Okla. Sup. Ct.) (Because Oklahoma corporate law is derived from Delaware law, Oklahoma adopts the construction of statutes by the highest court of that state.); see also Woolf v. Universal Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 1992 OK CIV APP 129, ¶6, 849 P.2d 1093 (holding, “We agree with the trial court that the Oklahoma General Corporation Act is based upon the Delaware General Corporations Act, and should be interpreted in accordance with Delaware decisions.”). 4. This article was written before the oral argument scheduled for Nov. 5, 2025. 5. In re Match Group Inc. Derivative Litigation, 315 A.3d 446 (Del. 2024). 6. Id. at 451. 7. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 8. Match Group, supra note 5. at 451. 9. Id. 10. Id. at 457. 11. Id. at 458. 12. Id. at 475. 13. Id. 14. Id. at 465. 15. “Delaware Revises Corporate Law to Strengthen Deals and Limit Stockholder Rights,” Baker Donelson (April 21, 2025), https://bit.ly/4d5qVXd. 16. S.B. 21, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §144 (Del. 2025). 17. S.B. 21, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §144(a) (Del. 2025). 18. Id. 19. S.B. 21, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §144(b) (Del. 2025). 20. S.B. 21, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §144(c) (Del. 2025). 21. S.B. 21, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §144(d)(2) (Del. 2025). 22. S.B. 21, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §144(d)(5) (Del. 2025). 23. S.B. 21, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §144 (Del. 2025). 24. S.B. 21, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §220 (Del. 2025). 25. Id. 26. Id. 27. S.B. 21, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §220(b)(4) (Del. 2025). 28. S.B. 21, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §220(f) (Del. 2025). 29. Pamela L. Millard and Austin Niggebrugge, “Plaintiffs Raise Constitutional Challenges to March 2025 Milestone Amendments to the DGCL; Delaware Governor Matt Meyer Files Motions to Intervene,” Cole Schotz (June 23, 2025), https://bit.ly/4aSb1hC. 30. Thomas Drew Rutledge v. Clearway Energy Group LLC, et al., 2025-0499-LWW (Del. Ch. 2025). 31. Pamela L. Millard, supra note 29. 32. Id. 33. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. (Del. 2025). 34. Salzberg, supra note 1. 35. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. (Del. 2025). 36. Salzberg, supra note 1. at 137. 37. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §115 (Del. 2025). 38. 8. Del. C. §115(c). 39. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 40. See S.B. 75, 2015 Leg., 1st Sess. (Del. 2015). 41. S.B. 95, 2015 Leg., 1st Sess. §§102(f), 109(b) (Del. 2025). 42. Id. 43. 8 Del. C. §115(b). 44. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. (Del. 2025). 45. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §103(f) (Del. 2025). 46. Id. 47. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §131(b) (Del. 2025). 48. Id. 49. See 8 Del. C. 50. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §131(b) (Del. 2025). 51. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §132(b) (Del. 2025). 52. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §155 (Del. 2025). 53. Id. 54. Id. 55. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §252(c) (Del. 2025). 56. Id. 57. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §311 (Del. 2025). 58. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §311(a)(4) (Del. 2025). 59. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §312 (Del. 2025). 60. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §312(g) (Del. 2025). 61. Id. 62. Id. 63. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §377 (Del. 2025). 64. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §377(e) (Del. 2025). 65. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §502 (Del. 2025). 66. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §502(a) (Del. 2025). 67. Id. 68. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §503 (Del. 2025). 69. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §503(e) (Del. 2025). 70. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §503(h) (Del. 2025). 71. S.B. 95, 2025 Leg., 1st Sess. §505 (Del. 2025). 72. Gary W. Derrick and Jacob L. Fanning, “Recent Developments for Corporations and LLCs,” OBJ (October 2024), https://bit.ly/4ukoOFw. 73. Id. 74. Clearway, supra note 30. On Feb. 27, 2026, the Delaware Supreme Court issued a decision upholding SB 21 as constitutional and a valid exercise of the Legislature’s authority, and also upheld SB 21’s retroactive application as constitutionally permissible. 75. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 782 P.2d 915, 920 (Okla. 1989) (“[T]he right of access to the courts protects only those substantive rights which have vested[.]”); see also Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (N.J. 1972); Ieropoli v. AC&S Corp., 842 A.2d 919, 927 (Pa. 2004); Berry By & Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah. 1985).
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