THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL 44 | NOVEMBER 2025 Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff. The court found this language to be critical because of a 1969 amendment to Article II, Section 19, which specifically provided for the right to trial by jury in “juvenile proceedings.” The court held that this evidenced the intent of the framers of the amendment to grant a right to a jury in termination trials. As such, the court explicitly overruled its prior cases and concluded by stating, “Parental rights are too precious to be terminated without the full panoply of protections afforded by the Oklahoma Constitution.” It is worth noting that the people of Oklahoma amended Article II, Section 19 again in 1990. This latest amendment removed the specific reference to “juvenile proceedings” and other types of cases that were enumerated in this section at the time A.E. was decided. However, the state Supreme Court has already held that the 1990 amendment does not change its holding in A.E.5 While the court did not explain its reasoning, its decision is sound based on the wording of the state question that created this amendment. The state question framed Article II, Section 19 as providing for six-person juries “only in some civil trials.” It went on to say that the measure would change the constitution to provide for 12-person juries in felonies and civil cases involving $10,000 or more, but a six-person jury would be required in “other trials.” The state question placed no limitation on these “other trials.” Indeed, it states that litigants may agree to a lesser number of jurors “in any case.”6 As such, it is reasonable to conclude that the framers of the 1990 amendment intended to expand the right to trial by jury rather than reduce it. Finally, while the language of Article II, Section 19 is expansive, case law has only ever applied it to parents. It has never explicitly been held to guarantee a child’s right to trial by jury. Nevertheless, children are full parties to deprived proceedings.7 Children also enjoy constitutional rights.8 As such, there should be no doubt that children have the same constitutional right to trial by jury that is guaranteed to their parents. Most importantly, children can assert this right independent of their parents’ decisions. STATUTORY FOUNDATION The Oklahoma Constitution is not the only guarantee of this right. Article 1 of Title 10A: The Children and Juvenile Code (the children’s code or the code) gives a parent, a child or the state the right to demand a jury trial. However, by statute, that demand is strictly limited to the issue of termination of parental rights. The code says the issue of adjudication – essentially, whether the juvenile deprived case should continue at all – must be tried to the bench.9 Even if the state files for immediate termination of parental rights, the code requires the bench to determine whether the children should be adjudicated as deprived while the jury only decides the issue of termination.10 No published case from the Oklahoma Supreme Court addresses the application of Article II, Section 19 to these statutes. One published case from the Court of Civil Appeals held that there was no right to a jury trial at a “dispositional hearing” – an informal proceeding where the rules of evidence do not apply – but did not engage in a robust constitutional analysis as to why.11 If nothing else, the statutory right to trial by jury remains as to the issue of termination. Once the demand for a jury trial has been made, it must be granted unless waived. This language indicates that a party who initially demands such a trial may later waive a jury, and the court is not bound by the prior demand. Absent a waiver, the trial court must then issue a scheduling order within 30 days, and the trial must begin within six months of the filing of that scheduling order. The court may go beyond this six-month period if it issues written findings of fact that there are exceptional circumstances to do so or if all the parties agree.12 Starting Nov. 1, 2025, bench trials must begin within 90 days of the scheduling order’s filing, although that time may be extended in the same manner as jury trials.13 But can the district court still hold a jury trial if all the parties agree to waive their right to one? There are no published cases answering this question. However, the language of the statute seems to indicate that the answer is yes. The relevant language states that a jury trial must be granted unless waived, “or the court on its own motion may call a jury to try any termination of parental rights case.” The quoted language is an independent clause that does not need to rely on any preceding part of the sentence to stand as a complete thought. It is also joined by the conjunction “or,” indicating a choice among options. Finally, the quoted language says the court can bring in a jury to try “any” termination case, which would presumably include one in which all other parties have waived a jury. As such, there are reasons to believe the court can force a jury trial even if none of the parties desire one.
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