AUGUST 2025 | 47 THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff. isn’t forthcoming, as with other torts. The plaintiff has at least two arguments for the exception. First, by adopting a “sliding scale,” a court could relax the first factor when it finds the other three weigh in the plaintiff’s favor. Second, the court could interpret UTSA §2(a) as authorizing injunctions even when the plaintiff would not succeed on the merits. The court can tailor its order or adjust the plaintiff’s bond to prevent unfairness to the defendant. Without some exception, a plaintiff’s task to save its stolen trade secrets may prove insurmountable. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Christopher A. Shrock is an associate with GableGotwals’ intellectual property group in Tulsa. He is a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, a copy editor of the Journal of Scottish Philosophy and a volunteer leader for Scouting America. ENDNOTES 1. Yaman Desai and Michael K. Hurst, IX. Starting Out with a Bang: Seeking Injunctive Relief for Trade Secret Misappropriation, in “Mapping The Battleground: Trade Secret Misappropriation in Texas State and Federal Courts,” TX CLE Intellectual Property Law Workshop (2022). (“Trade secrets cases are often effectively won or lost within weeks of the lawsuit being filed.”). 2. Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.2009) (“Once lost, [a trade secret] is lost forever.”). 3. E.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 78, §87(A); Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) §2(a). UTSA §2(c) authorizes mandatory injunctions – e.g., “surrender of the stolen information” – as well. 4. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc. v. Cahill, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1289 (E.D. Okla. 2013) (explaining injunctions cannot remedy past harms). 5. According to some, a court should only issue a temporary injunction for threatened misappropriation since an injunction would be powerless to stop a past misappropriation. IP Litigation Guide: Patents & Trade Secrets §10:9. 6. Restatement (Second) of Torts §936 cmt. e (1979); see, e.g., Celebrity Attractions, Inc. v. Oklahoma City Pub. Prop. Auth., No. CIV-151267-HE, 2016 WL 126882, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 11, 2016), aff’d, 660 F. App’x 600 (10th Cir. 2016); ProLine Prod., L.L.C. v. McBride, 2014 OK CIV APP 34, ¶3, 324 P.3d 430, 432. 7. Micro Consulting, Inc. v. Zubeldia, 813 F. Supp. 1514, 1534 (W.D. Okla. 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions, Chapter 29.1. 8. Chilcutt Direct Mktg., Inc. v. A Carroll Corp., 2010 OK CIV APP 58, ¶16, 239 P.3d 179, 183 (emphasis added). 9. AFGD, Inc. v. Tri-Star Glass, Inc., 2005 WL 8175945 (N.D. Okla. June 7, 2005). 10. AFGD, Inc. v. Tri-Star Glass, Inc., 2005 WL 8175945, at *4 (N.D. Okla. June 7, 2005). 11. Id.; see also PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). 12. California law exhibits a similar catch-22. There, threatened trade secret misappropriation means an “imminent” misuse manifested by a defendant’s words or conduct. Unless the thief has previously misused or disclosed the secrets, a plaintiff must prove the thief’s intent to use them, typically from the thief’s private communications. In other words, to prevent a first harm, a California plaintiff needs clear and convincing evidence that, probably, will emerge late in discovery – too late. See FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1279, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 316 (2009) (citing to Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp. v. Smith, 162 Cal. App. 4th 501, 527, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 771, 791 (2008)); Interbake Foods, L.L.C. v. Tomasiello, 461 F. Supp. 2d 943, 973 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (calling for a “substantial threat of impending injury”). 13. Prefatory Note, Uniform Trade Secrets Act with 1985 amendments. The Prefatory Note also complains that the Restatement (Second) of Torts omitted material from Restatement (First) of Torts §757, cmt. (b) (1939), which authorized injunctive relief for trade secret misappropriations. 14. Restatement (Second) of Torts §936, cmt. e (1979). 15. Restatement (Second) of Torts §936 cmt. e (1979); see, e.g., Celebrity Attractions, Inc. v. Oklahoma City Pub. Prop. Auth., No. CIV-151267-HE, 2016 WL 126882, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 11, 2016), aff’d, 660 F. App’x 600 (10th Cir. 2016); ProLine Prod., L.L.C. v. McBride, 2014 OK CIV APP 34, ¶3, 324 P.3d 430, 432. 16. Skycam, LLC v. Bennett, 2012 WL 4483610, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 27, 2012); see also Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden Cryogenics LLC, 630 F.Supp.2d 853, 867 (S.D. Ohio 2008); Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Quest Software, Inc., 333 F.Supp.2d 688, 700 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Union Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Tillman, 143 F.Supp.2d 638, 641-42 (N.D. Miss. 2000); Tracer Research Corp. v. Nat’l Env’t Serv. Co., 843 F.Supp. 568, 582 (D. Ariz. 1993); Boston Scientific Corp. v. Lee, 2014 WL 194687 (D. Mass.); Software Pricing Partners, LLC v. Geisman, 2022 WL 3971292 (W.D.N.C.); Xerox Corporation v. O’Dowd, 2006 WL 3053408 (M.D. Tenn.); HCAFranchise Corporation v. Alisch, 2016 WL 10706285 (N.D. Ind.); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F.Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y.). 17. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc. v. Cahill, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1291 (E.D. Okla. 2013). 18. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440, 64 S. Ct. 660, 675, 88 L. Ed. 834 (1944); The Sedona Conference Commentary on Equitable Remedies in Trade Secret Litigation, 23 Sedona Conf. J. 591, 700 (2022). 19. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc. v. Cahill, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1291 (E.D. Okla. 2013); see also Edwards Lifesciences Corp. v. Maximilien, 2023 WL 4680774 (C.D. Cal.); Pareto Health (AL), LLC v. WeCare TLC, LLC, 2021 WL 4860760 (N.D. Ala.); Northwood, Inc. v. Clinical Would Solutions, LLC, 2021 WL 1345574 (E.D. Mich.); Acceleration Products, Inc. v. Arikota, Inc., 2014 WL 3900875 (D. Utah). 20. Crystal Bay Ests. Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Cox, 2022 OK CIV APP 38, ¶12, 521 P.3d 812, 817 (citing to Dowell v. Pletcher, 2013 OK 50, 304 P.3d 457, as corrected (July 15, 2013)). 21. Restatement (Second) of Torts §936, cmt. e (1979). 22. McGinnity v. Kirk, 2015 OK 73, 362 P.3d 186. 23. Sharp v. 251st St. Landfill, Inc., 1991 OK 41, 810 P.2d 1270, overruled on other grounds by DuLaney v. Oklahoma State Dep’t of Health, 1993 OK 113, 868 P.2d 676. 24. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). 25. E.g., Horner Int’l Co. v. McKoy, 232 N.C. App. 559, 570, 754 S.E.2d 852, 860 (2014). 26. Crystal Bay Ests. Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Cox, 2022 OK CIV APP 38, ¶12, 521 P.3d 812, 817 n.6 (rejecting the sliding-scale analysis and also noting the essentiality of irreparable harm) (citing to Dowell v. Pletcher, 2013 OK 50, 304 P.3d 457, as corrected (July 15, 2013)). 27. Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016) (abrogating the relaxed standard). 28. E.g., Cont’l Oil Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 338 F.2d 780, 781-82 (10th Cir. 1964); Celebrity Attractions, Inc. v. Oklahoma City Pub. Prop. Auth., No. CIV-15-1267-HE, 2016 WL 126882, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 11, 2016) (applying the relaxed standard for likelihood of success). 29. Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016). The dissenting Judge Lucero recoiled from the majority’s “wooden” application of Winter and tried in vain to persuade his peers of the common sense of the “sliding-scale” approach, but alas, he did not prevail. For the old “sliding-scale” rule, see Star Fuel Marts, LLC v. Sam’s E., Inc., 362 F.3d 639, 652 (10th Cir. 2004). 30. UTSA §1(2). 31. UTSA §2(a) is the only reference to threatened misappropriation in the statute. 32. Actual, Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/actual (last accessed June 30, 2025); Threaten, MerriamWebster’s Dictionary, https://bit.ly/40sxnAK (last accessed June 30, 2025). 33. E.g., Assa Abloy Sales & Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. TASK, Fcz, 2018 WL 691711, at *7 (D. Conn. Feb. 2, 2018) (using the UTSA Sect. 2 authorization to enjoin a defendant as an alternative to the four-part test).
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