The Oklahoma Bar Journal August 2025

THE OKLAHOMA BAR JOURNAL 38 | AUGUST 2025 Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff. to the lower court in the Eastern District of Texas when this type of rule circumvents agency authority and the analysis to apply to such a situation. In Plano, the court would ultimately find that the proxy overcame the original characteristic.45 The Mayfield court also included an interesting note regarding Skidmore deference, which allows the court to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute.46 The weight given to the agency’s interpretation “depends on the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”47 The 5th Circuit seemed to question whether this deference still stands given the pronouncement in Loper Bright that “statutes have a ‘best reading ... the reading the court would have reached if no agency were involved,’ and ‘in the business of statutory interpretation, if it is not the best, it is not permissible.’”48 The court pointed out that this essentially means that Skidmore deference no longer exists. If the agency’s interpretation is the best, then it needs no deference because it is the interpretation the court would have reached. If it is not the best, it gets no deference because if it is not the best, deference is not permissible. The court did not address whether there can be multiple “best” readings of a statute, as reasonable minds can differ. Notwithstanding the questions it brought up, the court left it for another day because it found that the DOL’s interpretation of the exemption is the “best.”49 It went on to point out that whatever is left of Skidmore deference would apply here. The DOL has consistently issued minimum salary rules to define and delimit the exemption and has done so since the FLSA was passed.50 Moreover, Congress has amended the FLSA several times and has not once questioned the Minimum Salary Rule.51 Nondelegation Doctrine Mayfield also asserted that the EAP exemption violated the nondelegation doctrine because it lacked “an intelligible principle to guide the DOL’s power to define and delimit the EAP exemption’s terms.”52 The nondelegation doctrine asks whether Congress has impermissibly delegated its own power or the power of another branch to an agency. Power delegated to an agency violates the nondelegation doctrine when Congress delegates power without an intelligible principle that constrains the delegation. The intelligible principle test requires that Congress “set out guidance that ‘delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.’”53 This standard is not demanding. The court agreed with the district court that there are at least two intelligible principles. The first of these is the “FLSA’s statutory directive to eliminate substandard labor conditions that are detrimental to the health, efficiency, and general wellbeing of workers.”54 The second is the language of the exemption itself.55 Each of these provisions provides guidance to the DOL on how it should exercise its authority. While these provisions are not straightforward, the existing standard is not demanding.56 An intelligible principle needs only to be a guide for an agency; here, that guide exists. Thus, the DOL’s authority to define and delimit the terms of the EAP exemption is guided by an intelligible principle.57 The 2019 Rule Stands The court affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding that the 2019 Minimum Salary Rule did not exceed the DOL’s statutorily conferred authority. Nor did it violate the nondelegation doctrine. Thus, the rule was upheld. THE APPLICATION OF LOPER BRIGHT CHANGES THE GAME After the 5th Circuit’s decision in Mayfield,58 one might believe the DOL’s authority to raise the salary basis for the EAP exemption was well established. However, such is not the case. Remember that dicta quote from Mayfield: Adding an additional characteristic is consistent with the power to define and delimit, but that power is not unbounded. A characteristic with no rational relationship to the text and structure of the statute would raise serious questions. And so would a characteristic that differs so broadly in scope from the original that it effectively replaces it.59 This quote would become the basis upon which the court in Plano Chamber of Commerce, et al. v. U.S. Department of Labor, et al.,60 would vacate the 2024 DOL regulations on the minimum salary for the EAP exemption. Issues in Plano Chamber of Commerce In Plano Chamber of Commerce, the Plano Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter the “chamber”) was challenging the 2024 rule issued by the DOL that raised the minimum salary for the EAP61 exemption for overtime under the FLSA. The rule consisted of three distinct actions:

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