Oklahoma Bar Journal
Government & Administrative Law Practice
Charter Authority
By Gunner Briscoe
There are two categories of municipalities: those governed by statute and those governed by special charters.[i] A “charter municipality” is defined as “any municipality which has adopted a charter in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and laws of Oklahoma and at the time of adoption of the charter had a population of two thousand (2,000) or more.”[ii] In contrast, a statutory city is one governed by Oklahoma Municipal Code.[iii] Charter municipalities are vested with considerable degree of autonomy: “[w]ithin the limitations prescribed by the Constitution, it was clearly the intent of the framers…to delegate local self-government to cities under a charter form of government in a larger measure and to a greater extent than is accorded cities existing under general law.”[iv]
While most may intuitively say state law always supersedes municipal law, that is not always the case. The Oklahoma Constitution provides that a duly ratified municipal charter, upon gubernatorial approval, shall “become the organic law of such city.”[v] The Legislature, in enacting this constitutional provision, has provided that “[w]henever a charter is in conflict with any law relating to municipalities in force at the time of the adoption and approval of the charter, the provisions of the charter shall prevail and shall operate as a repeal or suspension of the state law or laws to the extent of any conflict.”[vi] By approving the municipality’s charter, “the state has surrendered a portion of its authority by giving home-rule cities sovereignty over their ‘municipal affairs’.”[vii] This preemption applies only when there is a conflict between provisions of charter and state law and conflicts are not idly found. A court will not find a conflict between a properly enacted municipal charter and a state law unless “each contains ‘express or implied conditions which are inconsistent and irreconcilable…if either is silent where the other speaks there can be no conflict.”[viii]
In explaining the preemptive power of municipal charters, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has analogized a municipal charter with a constitution.[ix] As an analog to a constitution, it “supersedes the laws of the state regarding ‘merely municipal affairs’.”[x] This line between “general matters of the state and its government” and “merely municipal affairs” “is the judicially accepted boundary between the domain in which the legislature is supreme and that in which the cities may insist upon independence.”[xi] “The determinative question is whether the issue involves a matter that is purely municipal, or whether there is a wider public interest.”[xii]
The clearest place where charter provisions will preempt is pertaining to conflicts between statute and charter relating to governing of the municipality.[xiii] Indeed, the Court of Civil Appeals went so far as to say such conflicts are the only conflicts that will result in charter preemption.[xiv] These are “procedural aspects of governing and to the form of governing” not relating to “substantive rights, duties and liabilities which the citizens of the state hold in common.”[xv] Nevertheless, the reach of charter preemption can be broad examples including: competitive bidding requirements;[xvi] street improvement districts;[xvii] dual office holding prohibition;[xviii] removal of a municipal judge;[xix] widening of a state highway within city limits;[xx] when ordinances take effect;[xxi] and the form of city government the municipality adopts.[xxii]
Municipal preemption is not unbounded, however. “[M]unicipal authority can be overcome despite ‘chiefly local interest’ if ‘the state has a sovereign interest’ in the municipal matter.”[xxiii] This line between “chiefly municipal affairs” and “sovereign state interest” is murky at best.[xxiv] Indeed, “many courts have acknowledged that they deliberately refuse to define the terms ‘municipal affairs’ and ‘state affairs’ in order that each case as it arises may be considered on its own facts[.]”[xxv] If the legislation “involves matters of the state at large” or if it “affects its people generally” state legislation will not be preempted by municipal charters.[xxvi] Examples where the state’s sovereign interest overcome “local interest” include: the Open Meetings Act;[xxvii] regulation of dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs;[xxviii] the court a municipal conviction is appealed to;[xxix] and school board elections.[xxx]
Aside from preempting conflicting state law pertaining to municipal concerns, “[c]hartered home-rule cities have full power of local government and may enact ordinances to protect the public peace, order, health, morals, and safety, even though state statutes may address the same subjects.”[xxxi] Ordinances authorized by charters may run concurrent with the general laws of the state but not counter to it when addressing matters of statewide interest.[xxxii]
Legal practitioners involved in municipal law – whether challenging municipal act, defending those acts, or advising municipalities – should stay cognizant of the authority vested in municipal charters. In particular, they should: 1) discern whether a municipality has a charter; 2) determine if the charter conflicts with state law; and, if so, 3) analyze whether it is a matter of purely municipal concern or a matter of statewide interest.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Gunner Briscoe is a municipal judge for Oklahoma City’s Municipal Criminal Court of Record.
ENDNOTES
[i] See, e.g., Question submitted by: The Honorable James E. Covey, State Representative, District 57, 2004 OK AG 15, ¶2
[ii] Okla. Stat. tit. 11 §1-102(1)
[iii] 2004 OK AG 15 ¶5 (citation omitted)
[iv] City of Tulsa v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 1990 OK 114 ¶9 (citation omitted)
[v] Okla. Con. Art. 18 §3(a)
[vi] Okla. Stat. tit. 11 §13-109; See also, Okla. Stat. tit. 11 §1-102(1) (“Once a municipal charter has been adopted and approved, it becomes the organic law of the municipality in all matters pertaining to the local government of the municipality and prevails over state law on matters relating to purely municipal concerns[.]”)
[vii] Edwards v. City of Sallisaw, 2014 OK 86 ¶11
[viii] Thomas v. Oklahoma City, 1998 OK CIV APP 14, ¶7 (citing Moore v. City of Tulsa, 1977 OK 43)
[ix] City of Tulsa v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 1990 OK 114 ¶10
[x] Id.
[xi] Id.
[xii] Id. (citation omitted)
[xiii] City of Chickasha v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 1981 OK CIV APP 5, ¶7
[xiv] Id.
[xv] Id
[xvi] U.S. Elevator Corp. v. City of Tulsa, 1980 OK 69
[xvii] Moore Funeral Homes, Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 1976 OK 96
[xviii] Question Submitted by: Robert E. Jones, Jr., Executive Director, Firefighters Pension and Retirement System, 2008 OK AG 15
[xix] Hampton v. Hammons, 1987 OK 77, ¶26
[xx] Id.
[xxi] Town of Luter v. State, 1967 OK 59
[xxii] Id.
[xxiii] Edwards v. City of Sallisaw, 2014 OK 86 ¶10 (citing Thurston v. Caldwell, 1913 OK 714 ¶10)
[xxiv] See, Question Submitted by: The Honorable Pual Taliaferro, Oklahoma State Senate, 1981 OK AG 213 ¶4 (likening the application of charter preemption to “beating a path through a jungle.”); Edwards v. City of Sallisaw, 2014 OK 86 ¶11 (“The line between chiefly municipal affair and a sovereign state interest is not well illuminate.”)
[xxv] Question Submitted by: The Honorable Homer F. Rieger, Oklahoma House of Representatives, 1981 OK AG 90, ¶7
[xxvi] City of Enid v. Public Employees Relations Board, 2006 OK 16, ¶22 (citing Lackey v. State, 1911 OK 270, ¶20)
[xxvii] Kingfisher v. Oklahoma, 1998 OK CIV APP 39
[xxviii] Question Submitted by: The Honorable Paul Wesselhoft, State Representative, District 54, 2005 OK AG 27
[xxix] Fossett v. State, 1926 OK CR 150
[xxx] Question Submitted by: The Honorable Frank Harbin, Oklahoma House of Representatives, 1981 OK AG 287
[xxxi] Thomas v. Oklahoma City, 1998 OK CIV APP 14, ¶7
[xxxii] Question Submitted by: The Honorable Pual Taliaferro, Oklahoma State Senate, 1981 OK AG 213, ¶2
Originally published in the Oklahoma Bar Journal – OBJ 97 No. 8 (October 2026)
Statements or opinions expressed in the Oklahoma Bar Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Oklahoma Bar Association, its officers, Board of Governors, Board of Editors or staff.